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Federal common law is a puzzle. Despite Erie's declaration that
"[t]here is no federal general common law,"' well-established and stable
pockets of federal common law persist in several areas: cases affecting the
rights and obligations of the United States,2 disputes between states, 3 cases
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I Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938).
2 See discussion infra Part HIA.
3 See discussion infra Part f.B.
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affecting international relations,4 and admiralty.5 If anything, federal com-
mon law is expanding. Eighteen years ago, a case in which state law was in
"significant conflict" with "uniquely federal interests" provided an occasion
for the Supreme Court to create another form of federal common law.6 Five
years ago, the Court added yet another piece to the puzzle, holding that the
preclusive effect to be given to a judgment in a diversity case was a ques-
tion of federal common law.7
Erie, of course, does not preclude common law rulemaking in these
pockets. In these areas, federal common law applies in both state and fed-
eral courts; Erie bars federal courts only from creating federal common law
applicable in federal courts when state courts would apply state law.8 But
the statutory, policy, and constitutional rationales of Erie are in tension with
the continued existence of federal common law.9 If federal (and state)
4 See discussion infra Part H.C.
5 See discussion infra Part II.D.
6 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507-09 (1988), discussed infra Part II.E.
7 Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), discussed infra Part II.F. The Court
had already held that federal law governed the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment in a federal ques-
tion case. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903).
8 See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The
federal courts have no general common law .... But this is not to say that wherever we have occasion to
decide a federal question which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone we may not resort to all of the
source materials of the common law, or that when we have fashioned an answer it does not become a part of
the federal non-statutory or common law. I do not understand Justice Brandeis's statement in [Erie] that
'There is no federal general common law,' to deny that the common law may in proper cases be... the basis
of... decision of federal questions."). According to standard theory, federal common law is a species of fed-
eral law, which state courts must apply by virtue of the command of the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST.
art. VI, §1, cl. 2; Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675, 689 (N.C. 1999). But see An-
thony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825 (2005)
(rejecting view that the Supremacy Clause is an adequate basis on which to compel state courts to make fed-
eral common law, but concluding that historical practices, constitutional structure, and adjudicatory norms
permit state courts to make federal common law in certain circumstances). As we discuss infra note 185 and
accompanying text, Semtek operates only in federal courts, and seems to be the type of federal common law
that Erie precludes. In fact, Semtek can be explained by our theory of federal common law. See infra notes
308-327 and accompanying text.
9 According to Justice Brandeis, three arguments supported the result in Erie. First, the regime of federal
common law created by the then-regnant Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), was inconsistent with the
Rules of Decision Act. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-74 (1938). Second, federal common law
created undesirable policy outcomes such as lack of "uniformity in the administration of the law of the state"
and discrimination against in-state parties by parties who could often change citizenship in order to avail
themselves of more favorable federal law. Id. at 74-78; cf Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (re-
casting these policies into "the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance
of inequitable administration of the laws"). Third, the use of federal law in diversity cases in which state
courts would have applied state law was unconstitutional. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-80. Erie never identified the
precise constitutional defect from which Swift v. Tyson suffered. Some of the language in the opinion, as well
as the first generation of Erie scholarship, tended to locate the defect in the Tenth Amendment. More recent
scholarship has regrounded Erie as a separation of powers case. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS
AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERiE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000) (describing both Brandeis's own theory of constitutional
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courts have broad powers to make federal common law, then the power re-
fused to federal courts in Erie pales in comparison to the power retained by
federal (and state) courts to establish federal rules of decision.
Reconciling Erie and federal common law is only a part of the chal-
lenge. Following the analysis of Paul Mishkin" and Henry Friendly," the
Supreme Court has held that courts are not required to exercise their federal
common lawmaking powers in all cases; the application is in some cases
discretionary, and courts can choose to apply extant state law rather than to
create new federal law.'2 As a practical matter, this declination of power
lessens the tensions with Erie's penumbra. 3 But it also makes difficult any
attempt to craft a theory that both justifies courts' power to create federal
law and guides the discretionary refusal to exercise this power. 4
This Article begins our effort to craft such a theory. One of the fun-
damental difficulties in developing any theory of federal common law is de-
fining what federal common law is. The Supreme Court has never assayed
a definition, and the commentators are divided over a proper definition. 5 In
this Article, we examine only those cases in which the Supreme Court ac-
knowledges that it is establishing federal common law.
judging and the historical treatment of Erie by scholars); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Juris-
diction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEx. L. REV. 79
(1993).
Erie's policy rationale would not necessarily be offended by a robust power to create federal com-
mon law. As long as the law applied in both state and federal courts is uniform, the undesirable policy
consequences of Swift v. Tyson can be avoided. Indeed, since federal law provides greater uniformity
both within the courts of one state and across the court systems of the various states, Erie's policy ra-
tionale arguably supports the broad use of federal common law.
The statutory and constitutional rationales are less tolerant of federal common law. The statutory ra-
tionale has come under attack in recent years, as some scholars have argued that the phrasing of the
Rules of Decision Act authorized federal courts to create their own common law. WILFRED J. RITZ,
REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: ExPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING
PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 126-48 (1990); Borchers, supra; Jerome A. Hoffman, Thinking
out Loud About the Myth of Erie: Plus a Good Word for Section 1652, 70 MISS. L.J. 163 (2000). As
long as the Court adheres to Erie's interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, however, federal com-
mon law and § 1652 co-exist uneasily. Likewise, in their strongest form, federalism and separation of
powers concerns leave no room for federal common law to operate. See infra notes 187-191 and ac-
companying text.
10 Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of
National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957).
11 Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,
405 (1964).
12 See, e.g, Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09 (incorporating state preclusion law); United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
13 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09.
14 Cf Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881,
950-62 (1986) (suggesting that the two-prong inquiry of power and discretion should be collapsed into a sin-
gle inquiry, the power to create federal common law in nondiversity cases is vast, and the only real question
is the set of factors that limit federal common law).
15 See infra notes 21-44 and accompanying text.
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Part I describes the conflicting definitions of federal common law. We
adopt, for analytical purposes, the narrowest understanding: that federal
common law exists only in those six "enclaves"' 6 in which the Supreme
Court has acknowledged its exercise of federal common lawmaking power.
Part II describes these six enclaves in more detail. Part III reviews the lit-
erature and shows the inadequacy of the positions that have emerged to ex-
plain or criticize federal common law. Finally, Part IV develops our theory
of federal common law and its relationship to Erie.
Briefly stated, our theory is that in certain areas, states have such a
strong self-interest in a controversy or have erected such high barriers to po-
litical participation by some groups that state law cannot be expected to
provide a sufficiently detached, reliable, and neutral rule of decision for a
controversy. For instance, states cannot be expected to create neutral prin-
ciples when they are involved in border disputes with other states. In these
areas, states must resort to another source of law. Unless Congress or the
Constitution has created a rule of decision, that law must by default be fed-
eral common law.1 Such bias is not, in itself, a sufficient condition to cre-
ate federal common law; factors noted by other commentators-especially
the need to achieve uniformity in a matter of national interest-also deter-
mine the decision. But potential bias in creating state law is a necessary
condition for creating federal common law.
On the other hand, in certain areas a state's self-interest in the outcome
is less acute, and participation by interested parties is possible. In these
cases, no resort to a separate body of federal common law is necessary, and
states can legitimately create the rules of decision. Even when there is suf-
ficient impartiality in the creation of law, however, reasons may exist to
doubt the impartial application of state law against poorly represented in-
terests. In these cases, a neutral forum to apply state law is all that is re-
quired-hence Erie, which commands the use of state law in diversity
cases, for which federal courts supply the neutral forum in which to apply
that law. 8 Rather than being in tension, federal common law and Erie work
together.
16 The use of the word "enclave" seems to have originated in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 426 (1964). See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (describing "limited en-
claves" of federal common law); Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1026 (1967).
17 Our theory recognizes the primacy of congressional authority to create law so that the federal common
law power yields in the face of a federal statute that occupies the field. Cf Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 317 (1981) (holding that the power to make a federal common law of interstate pollution was supplanted
by "the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative
agency").
18 The thesis that diversity jurisdiction exists primarily to provide a neutral forum to protect against state
court bias against out-of-state litigants has been around as long as the Constitution. In The Federalist Papers,
Hamilton observed:
The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which the State tribunals cannot
be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own
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Our theory also explains why courts sometimes incorporate state law
as the federal common law rule. The raison d'etre for federal common law
is potential self-interested bias. The presumption in favor of federal com-
mon law can be overcome with a showing that self-interest or barriers to
participation are not in fact present. When bias does not exist and no other
factors counsel the creation of a uniquely federal rule of decision, a court
has discretion to choose state law as the federal rule of decision.
Indeed, only one of the classic forms of federal common law-
"instance" cases in admiralty' 9-arguably escapes our theory. Although we
argue that instance cases can be accounted for within our theory, we suggest
that the likelihood of state law bias in instance cases is sufficiently small
that state law could now control their decision.2"
I. THE DEFINITION(S) OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The Supreme Court has been unsuccessful in offering either an inclu-
sive definition or a theory of federal common law. Indeed, it has never
really tried.2" On the assumption that the first step in analyzing a problem is
cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias. This principle has no
inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts as the proper tribunals for the determina-
tion of controversies between different States and their citizens.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carl Van Doren ed., 1973). See Bank of United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (noting that "the constitution itself... views with
such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals
for the decision of controversies ... between citizens of different states"); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3.2 (4th ed. 2003) (describing arguments for diversity juris-
diction). To the extent that this rationale seeks to justify our present use of diversity jurisdiction, it is
controversial. Some argue that the fears of bias in favor of in-state litigants no longer pertain, and others
argue that bias provides an insufficient account of the present structure of diversity jurisdiction. See,
e.g., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 38-40 (1990)
(positing that arguable concerns for bias are not sufficiently strong to outweigh costs of diversity juris-
diction); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483 (1928)
(arguing against continued relevance of fears of bias); Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU
L. REV. 97 (1990). Neither argument diminishes the force of the theory we propose.
19 For the definition of "instance" cases, see infra notes 133-145 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 306 and accompanying text.
21 See Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 895, 915 (1996) (observing
that the Supreme Court "never has had an entirely consistent theoretical conception of the nature and extent
of federal common law making power"); see also id at 915 n.63 (listing sources to same effect); Field, supra
note 14, at 890 ("Definitions of the phrase 'federal common law' differ. No definition is inherently cor-
rect .... ).
Perhaps the Court's best effort to create a coherent understanding of federal common law occurred
in 1980, when the Court observed that the "few and restricted" areas of federal common law "fall into
essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect uniquely fed-
eral interests, and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law."
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947) (arguing that federal
common law covered matters "vitally affecting interests, powers and relations of the Federal Govern-
ment [that] require uniform national disposition rather than diversified state rulings" and that Erie was
not intended to have the "purpose or effect for broadening state power over matters essentially of federal
100:585 (2006)
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defining it, commentators have therefore offered various definitions of fed-
eral common law. For our purposes, we can identify three main defini-
tions-one narrow, one intermediate, and one broad. The intermediate
definition is the modem standard: "Federal common law" means "federal
rules of decision whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of
interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands."22
This definition is broad enough to encompass each of the six enclaves
in which the Supreme Court has self-avowedly created federal common
law. But it controversially excludes several important situations in which a
court might arguably be said to be creating federal common law. First, this
definition excludes circumstances in which a court creates federal rules of
decision in response to an explicit statutory command. For example, Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 501 directs federal courts, in any area not otherwise
governed by federal constitutional or statutory law, to develop the rules of
privilege using federal common law "in the light of reason and experi-
ence."
23
Second, this definition excludes situations in which courts imply the
power to create federal common law. Such a power might derive from a
statute. For instance, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills24 interpreted
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act25 to imply a power,
fashioned from the policy of national labor law, to create federal common
law to enforce collective bargaining agreements,26 and Illinois v. City of
character or for determining whether issues are of that nature"). Texas Industries's latter category does
not involve federal common law of the kind we discuss in this Article. See infra notes 24-30 and ac-
companying text. The former category of "uniquely" or "vital" federal interests is less an analytical
conception of federal common law than a conclusory label. See Field, supra note 14, at 909 (noting that
the cases "reveal an extensive federal common law, of many different varieties, with no coherent unify-
ing principle, whose current boundaries are uncertain"); infra notes 218-219 and accompanying text.
22 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 685 (5th ed. 2003).
23 In full, the Rule states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Con-
gress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the prin-
ciples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501. This rule was initially enacted by legislation. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933-34 (1976).
24 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
25 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 301, 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1948) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 185 (2000)).
26 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456. Similarly, it has often been claimed that section 1 of the Sherman Act
is an implicit directive for federal courts to create a federal common law of antitrust. See Nat'l Soc'y of
Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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Milwaukee2 1 interpreted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act28 to permit
the creation of federal common law for environmental pollution. Similarly,
defenses 29 and presumptions3 ° can be judicially implied from a federal
claim. Because Congress implicitly grants courts a common law power, the
standard definition does not treat the question as one about the power of
courts to make federal common law, but rather as one about the power of
Congress to delegate its lawmaking function.
Third, the standard definition excludes another circumstance that ar-
guably involves common lawmaking power: implying judge-made reme-
dies to supplement federal statutes or constitutional rights. Although the
Supreme Court's decisions concerning private rights of action to supple-
ment a federal statute have not been uniform,3 1 these inconsistencies are un-
important for purposes of the standard definition. Because the court that
creates a supplementary remedy must begin its analysis by examining the
statutory scheme, the remedy is traceable to a congressional enactment, and
therefore fails to meet the standard definition's criteria for federal common
law.3 2  On the same analysis, the standard definition does not extend to
situations in which a court creates a remedy to protect a right granted in the
Constitution.33 Although these cases may involve different considerations
27 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
28 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), superceded by 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(2000).
29 See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,
315 U.S. 447 (1942). Boyle, which also involves the creation of a federal common law defense, should be
distinguished from these cases, for the underlying claim in Boyle was one grounded in state law, and the fed-
eral defense could not therefore be implied from the existence of a federal claim. Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
30 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
31 Compare J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) ("'[W]here legal rights have been invaded,
and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done."' (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946))), with Corn v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (abandoning the Borak approach and creating a four-factor test to determine whether
a federal statute implies a private right of action, with legislative intent being one of the four factors), and
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (holding that, in deciding whether a private right
of action exists, "our task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private
right of action"). For the time being, the Court has settled on the Touche Ross analysis. Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) ("Statutory intent ... is determinative."); cf City of Rancho Palos
Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453 (2005) (employing a similar inquiry into congressional intent in determin-
ing whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits suits against state officials for violations of federal statutes).
32 Cf Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993) (implying an "ancil-
lary" right of contribution from an implied Rule lOb-5 right of action); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 ("The
question of the existence of a statutory cause of action is, of course, one of statutory construction.").
33 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(creating a remedy in damages for a violation of a private citizen's Fourth Amendment rights by federal offi-
cials); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the "exclusionary rule," a remedy making evidence
seized in violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights inadmissible against that person in court); Ex
Pane Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (creating an injunctive remedy against a state official for state violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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than those in which the courts supplement a statutory scheme,34 a remedy
implied to enforce a constitutional interest is traceable to the Constitution,
not to the power of a common law court.
Finally, the standard defmition excludes most federal procedural rules.
In large measure, the question of the power to create federal procedural
rules has been one of determining whether federal courts can apply proce-
dural rules different than those of a state court sitting in the same geo-
graphical area. The analysis devolves into either an Erie inquiry or an
inquiry about whether a particular procedural rule is traceable to and conso-
nant with an implementing statute such as the Rules Enabling Act.35 In ei-
ther case, the question does not meet the standard definition's criteria for
federal common law. On the other hand, some federal procedural rules,
such as rules of preclusion for claims or issues that were initially decided by
federal courts,36 or the right to a jury factfinder on certain federal claims,37
do apply in both federal and state courts. Even here, however, the proce-
dural rules are not necessarily an instance of federal common law rulemak-
ing. For instance, the requirement that state courts use a jury as factfinder
in FELA cases is traceable to the federal statute, not to the court's common
law powers.38
The standard definition can be criticized on two grounds. First, its de-
scription lacks justificatory force. The definition fails to explain why fed-
eral common law is limited only to six categories and provides no
principles that should guide courts in deciding whether to exercise common
law rulemaking in the future. Second, the definition excludes a number of
situations, like those just described, that look, smell, and feel like federal
common law rulemaking.
Broader and narrower sets of definitions seek to remedy, respectively,
the difficulties of the standard definition. A broad definition encompasses
everything included within the standard definition, plus many or all situa-
tions excluded by it. "Federal common law," in other words, constitutes
"any rule of federal law created by a court ... when the substance of that
34 Or perhaps not. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]t strikes me as no more ap-
propriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard to... legal in-
terests [protected by the Constitution] than with respect to interests protected by federal statutes.").
35 The present version of the Rules Enabling Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). On the relation-
ship among procedural roles, Erie, and the Rules Enabling Act, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); and
Gasperini v. Center. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
36 See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); see also DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 144-51 (2001).
37 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
38 Cf Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947 (2001)
(discussing potential constitutional limits on the ability of Congress and federal courts to fashion procedural
rules binding on state courts).
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rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or con-
gressional."39  Indeed, in one extreme form, the definition denies that a
meaningful line can be drawn between creating common law and interpret-
ing constitutional or statutory enactments; every time a court addresses a
question of federal law, it is making common law.40
A broad definition has the advantage of not gerrymandering a defini-
tion simply to cover what the Supreme Court has itself stated to be common
law. It also links "classic" federal common law to related issues, such as
the implication of remedies from statutes or the Constitution, that seem to
functionally behave as exercises of judicial authority. A broad definition
lacks, obviously, any internal principle that explains the limitations that the
Court has itself placed on creating federal common law. As Professor Field
remarks, "[J]udicial power to act is not limited to particular enclaves
and... is much broader than the usual references to judicial power would
suggest."'"
On the other side, a narrow definition of federal common law suggests
that federal common law can exist only in certain defined enclaves, the con-
tent of which are determined by the Court. Thus, federal common law is
made when the United States is a party, in interstate disputes, in foreign re-
lations matters, and in admiralty. Of course, this enclave approach worked
better before the most recent expansion of federal common law in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp.42 and Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp.43 A definition that simply adds new categories as time goes
by is not a definition, but rather a list.
A proper definition acts, in a system of reasoned adjudication, as a
constraint on the raw, unbridled exercise of judicial lawmaking. In our
view, Professor Field offers the best definition; at a minimum, her defini-
tion forces anyone wishing to craft a theory of federal common law to con-
sider the theory's implications for issues such as the creation of private
rights of action under federal statutes and the Constitution. But we need not
belabor the definitional point. As Professor Field correctly observes, a
principal function of a definition is simply to establish a common lexicon
39 See Field, supra note 14, at 890; see also id. (stating that the definition includes such areas as rules de-
signed by courts in response to a congressional or constitutional command to create rules in an area, remedies
created for violations of constitutional provisions, remedies implied in otherwise silent statutory schemes, and
even interpretation of federal statutes). For a comparable definition, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) ('Federal common law,' as I use the term,
means any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text-
whether or not that rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional or an un-
conventional sense.").
40 See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 807 (1989).
41 Field, supra note 14, at 887.
42 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
43 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
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for analysis." Any valid theory must at a minimum justify the results of the
cases in which the Supreme Court has expressly indicated that it is making
federal common law. For purposes of this Article, therefore, we accept the
narrowest definition of federal common law, and limit our analysis to the
existing enclaves of federal common law. We leave to future analysis the
extension of the theory to the range of issues suggested by the broader defi-
nitions of the subject.
II. THE ENCLAVES OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Traditionally, federal common law governed four pockets, or enclaves:
(1) cases affecting the rights and obligations of the United States (typically,
but not always, when the United States is a party), (2) interstate controver-
sies, (3) international relations, and (4) admiralty. In more recent years, the
Supreme Court has expanded federal common law beyond these traditional
enclaves, creating (5) the government contractor defense, a doctrine which
involves "uniquely federal interests" that significantly conflict with state
law rules of decision, and (6) certain federal rules of preclusion. We briefly
examine each enclave.
A. Cases Affecting the Rights and Obligations of the United States
The first area in which courts have created federal common law in-
volves cases affecting the rights and obligations of the United States.
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States45 is seminal. Clair Barner, at the cen-
ter of the case, performed work for the Works Progress Administration. On
April 28, 1936, a check for $24.20, drawn on the Treasurer of the United
States, was mailed to Barner. He never received it. Instead, an unknown
person, who identified himself as Barner, cashed it at the J.C. Penney store
in Clearfield, Pennsylvania. J.C. Penney endorsed the check over to the
Clearfield Trust Company, which in turn endorsed it to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia for payment, guaranteeing all prior endorsements. All
of the endorsers acted in good faith, and none knew of the forgery.46
Around May 10, 1936, Barner complained to his supervisor that he had
never received the check. The United States informed Clearfield Trust of
the forgery on January 12, 1937. Clearfield Trust first received notice that
the United States was asking for reimbursement on August 31, 1937."7 In
1939, the United States sued to recover its payment, basing its claim on
Clearfield Trust's guaranty of the prior endorsements.48 The District Court
held that "the rights of the parties were to be determined by the law of
44 See Field, supra note 14, at 890.
45 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
46 See id. at 364-65.
47 See id. at 365. The record does not disclose the reason for the length of the delay by the United States
both in notifying Clearfield Trust and in seeking payment.
48 Id.
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Pennsylvania and that, since the United States unreasonably delayed in giv-
ing notice of the forgery to the Clearfield Trust Co., it was barred from re-
covery." '4 9 The Circuit Court reversed, holding that Erie did not require the
application of state law to the matter.50
The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court. Because the United
States' authority to issue a check derives solely from the Constitution and
federal statutes and is "in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or
of any other state,"5 the Supreme Court found that "[t]he rights and duties
of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by
federal rather than local law. '5  In the absence of any controlling federal
statute, "it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law ac-
cording to their own standards."53 The Court reasoned:
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale and
transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in
several states. The application of state law ... would subject the rights and
duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of
the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.54
This reasoning has been resoundingly affirmed in subsequent decisions, in-
cluding in cases dealing with commercial paper issued by the United
States55 and federal government contracts.56
Moreover, the United States need not be a party to a case for this ra-
tionale to apply. Rather, the effect on the rights and obligations of the
United States occasioned by the involvement of a federal agency or official
49 Id. at 366.
50 United States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F.2d 93, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1942).
51 Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 366.
52 Id.
53 ld. at 367.
54 Id. The common law rule the Court proceeded to create resulted in a victory for the United States.
The Court held that a drawee's failure to give prompt notice of a forged endorsement to the payor of a check
bars the drawee's suit "only on a clear showing [by the payor] that the drawee's delay in notifying him of the
forgery caused him damage." Id. at 370. Finding that Clearfield Trust had not made this showing, the Court
allowed the government's claim to proceed. See id.
55 See Nat'l Metro. Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945) (discussing the "rights and liabilities
of the government which stem from the issuance and circulation of its commercial paper" and affirmning that
"legal questions involved in controversies over such commercial papers are to be resolved by the application
of federal rather than local law and that, in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress, federal courts must
fashion the governing rules"); cf Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230, 1238 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (de-
scribing the rule that bars suits alleging constitutional violations by federal officials who failed to honor con-
tractual promises to former spies as a "federal common-law rule"); Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S.
417 (1996) (applying without discussion federal common law of implied contracts).
56 See Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (applying federal common law to
the construction of a federal government contract and stating that it "is customary, where Congress has not
adopted a different standard, to apply to the construction of government contracts the principles of general
contract law"); United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106, 111 (1944) (same).
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is sufficient to trigger the application of federal law. In United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc.," the Court, ruling in two consolidated cases, found
that, absent a federal statute setting priorities, federal common law governs
the question of whether contractual liens arising from certain federal loan
programs-in one case administered by the Small Business Administration
("SBA"), and in the other by the Farmers Home Administration ("FHA")-
take precedence over private liens:
The SBA and FHA unquestionably perform federal functions within the mean-
ing of Clearfield. Since the agencies derive their authority to effectuate loan
transactions from specific Acts of Congress passed in the exercise of a "consti-
tutional function or power,".., their rights, as well, should derive from a fed-
eral source. When Government activities "aris[e] from and bea[r] heavily
upon a federal.., program," the Constitution and Acts of Congress "'require'
otherwise than that state law govern of its own force." ... In such contexts,
federal interests are sufficiently implicated to warrant the protection of federal
law."
The Court continued,
That the statutes authorizing these federal lending programs do not specify the
appropriate rule of decision in no way limits the reach of federal law. It is pre-
cisely when Congress has not spoken "'in an area comprising issues substan-
tially related to an established program of government operation,"'... that
Clearfield directs federal courts to fill the interstices of federal legislation "ac-
cording to their own standards."59
B. Interstate Controversies
A second broad category in which federal common law controls, in the
absence of a governing federal constitutional or statutory provision, is that
of disputes involving two or more states. Typically these cases involve wa-
ter-apportionment, pollution, or boundary disputes, ° and they often involve
states as opposing parties. Early cases in this area tended to be intensely
factual. Consequently, "for the first century or so the Court gave little at-
tention to the precise source of law."'" Courts did, however, realize that
what they really were doing was applying federal law, and at that, federal
common law. The Supreme Court declared that the law it applied in con-
57 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
58 Id. at 726-27 (citations and footnotes omitted).
59 Id at 727 (citations omitted).
60 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (water pollution); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838) (boundary dispute); Lund, supra note 21, at 917 n.69.
61 Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 348 n.80 (1992); see also Con-
necticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931) ("For the decision of suits between States, federal, state
and international law are considered and applied by this Court as the exigencies of the particular case may
require.").
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troversies between two states was beyond the competence of either state to
prescribe, and thus could not be altered by either state.62
Among the most explicit statements on the power of courts to create
federal common law in disputes between two states are those found in Hin-
derlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,63 a case authored by
Justice Brandeis and decided on the same day as his far more famous deci-
sion in Erie. Hinderlider involved a dispute between two parties over rights
to the waters of the La Plata River, which forms part of the border between
Colorado and New Mexico.' In 1898, the plaintiff, a Colorado citizen, had
established water rights to a significant portion of the La Plata's summer-
time flow. Allegedly, Hinderlider, State Engineer of Colorado, had refused
to permit the plaintiff to divert any water from the La Plata during certain
periods of time.65 Hinderlider defended himself by arguing that an interstate
compact between Colorado and New Mexico, ratified by the states and by
Congress in the 1920s, gave him the authority to override the plaintiffs wa-
ter use and permit the water to flow downstream to other uses in both states.
The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the plaintiff's rights.66
The Supreme Court reversed. According to the Court, the plaintiffs
rights in water from the La Plata could not be greater than the rights of the
State of Colorado, under whose law the plaintiff had obtained its rights.
62 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) ("[T]he common law is but the accumulated expres-
sions of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain what is right and just between individuals in
respect to private disputes.... (D]isputes between [states] must be settled either by force or else by appeal to
tribunals empowered to determine the right and wrong thereof. Force, under our system of Government, is
eliminated. The clear language of the Constitution vests in this court the power to settle those disputes. We
have exercised that power in a variety of instances, determining in the several instances the justice of the dis-
pute."); id. at 98 ("If the two States were absolutely independent nations it would be settled by treaty or by
force. Neither of these ways being practicable, it must be settled by decision of this court.").
63 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
64 As the Court explained:
The La Plata River rises in the mountains of Colorado, flows in a southerly direction until it
reaches the boundary of New Mexico and in the latter State until it empties into the San Juan
River. The stream is non-navigable; has a narrow watershed; and a large run-off in the early
spring. Then the quantity flowing begins to fall rapidly; and during the summer months little wa-
ter is available for irrigation. In each State the water of the stream has long been used for irriga-
tion; and each adopted the so-called appropriation doctrine of water use. Under that doctrine the
first person who acts toward the diversion of water from a natural stream and the application of
such water to a beneficial use has the first right, provided he diligently continues his enterprise to
completion and beneficially applies the water. The rights of subsequent appropriations are subject
to rights already held in the stream.
Id. at 97-98 (footnote omitted).
65 Id. at 95-97. A particularly dry summer in 1928 occasioned the actions of the defendant. The flow of
the river was so low that allowing the plaintiff its full use of water under its 1898 rights would have deprived
all downstream users of water. Hinderlider and his counterpart in New Mexico decided to permit all of the
river's water to flow into New Mexico for ten days, then to divert all water to Colorado uses for ten days,
then back to New Mexico for ten days, and so on.
66 Because the case did not involve a dispute between two or more states, and did not even involve a
state as a party, the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction in the case. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2;
28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
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Nor could the conferral of rights by the State of Colorado bind either the
State of New Mexico or its citizens.67 Instead, each state was entitled only
to an equitable share of the water from the La Plata.
The Court indicated that the source of the principle of equitable appor-
tionment could be either a compact or federal common law.68 Whether a
compact or federal common law did the heavy lifting in Hinderlider is un-
clear. Both sources established precisely the same principle of apportion-
ment, and therefore led to precisely the same result. On the one hand, the
Court seemed to suggest that, because federal common law predated the es-
tablishment of the plaintiffs rights in 1898, it was federal common law that
acted to limit each State's right to grant its citizens an interest in the water
from the river.69 On the other hand, the Court stated that any person's rights
to water or property were subject to later compacts that adjusted disputed
rights among states.7" On the latter view, the compact, and not federal
common law, provided the ratio decidendi of the case.
At the end of the case, however, the Court turned to the issue of
whether it had appellate or certiorari jurisdiction to entertain the case-a
determination that hinged on the then-extant jurisdictional statutes on
whether a federal question was present. The Court acknowledged that the
compact created no federal question because the compact was not a treaty
or statute of the United States. But it argued that the judgment of the state
court depended on the assumption that the State of Colorado was absolutely
entitled to take all the water. That assumption was in error, and therein lay
the jurisdiction-conferring federal question: "[W]hether the water of an in-
terstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of
'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of
either State can be conclusive."'" Thus, the ability of courts to fashion fed-
eral common law for interstate disputes was essential to the judgment in
Hinderlider.
Hinderlider made clear that the power to create federal common law in
controversies affecting states and their citizens is not limited to cases to
which states are the only parties.72 Even more significant is Hinderlider's
temporal juxtaposition with Erie. Before Hinderlider, the proposition that
federal common law supplied the appropriate rule of decision in disputes
between states was largely taken for granted.73 Hinderlider shows that Erie
67 Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 102-03.
68 Id. at 106.
69 Id at 102-03.
70 Id. at 104-05.
71 Id. at 110.
72 Seeid. at 110-11.
73 Hinderlider favorably cited numerous cases that used federal common law to resolve border disputes,
including Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Con-
necticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); and Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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did not change this understanding. As the Court said in dicta,
"[j]urisdiction over controversies concerning rights in interstate streams is
not different from those concerning boundaries. These have been recog-
nized as presenting federal questions."74
The federal common lawmaking power in this enclave has never been
seriously questioned. Commentators generally agree that federal common
law governs in disputes between states.75 In recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, federal common law has been applied without comment.76
C. International Relations
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino" announced a third area con-
trolled by federal common law: foreign relations. In Sabbatino, the defen-
dant, a New York corporation, had contracted with an American-owned
Cuban company (C.A.V.) to buy sugar in Cuba.78 In response to American
congressional79 and executive8" action, which resulted in a decrease of the
sugar quota for Cuba, the Cuban Council of Prime Ministers passed a law
giving the Cuban President and Prime Minister the power to nationalize
property or enterprises in which American nationals had an interest by
forcible expropriation.81 Under this law, the Cuban government expropri-
ated the sugar and passed title to a bank that was an instrumentality of the
Cuban government. The defendant signed a contract with the bank, agree-
ing to the same terms that it had negotiated with C.A.V. The bank then as-
signed its right to payment (embodied in bills of lading) to a second bank,
which was also an instrumentality of the Cuban government.82
When the sugar arrived in New York, the defendant accepted the bills
of lading presented by a nominee of the second bank. It then negotiated the
bills to its customer and received payment for the sugar. However, it re-
74 Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 110 (citing Rust Land & Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 250 U.S. 71, 76 (1919);
Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 295 (1918); Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 8 (1887); Howard v. Inger-
soll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381 (1851)).
75 See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 66 n.37 (1995) (noting that some scholars
believe that, in controversies between the states, federal courts "have the authority to formulate governing law
even in the absence of a statute"); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L.
REV. 263, 288 n.84 (1992) ("Federal Courts exercise lawmaking authority unconnected to substantive laws
enacted by Congress in cases involving ... disputes between states."); Lund, supra note 21, at 917 n.69 (ar-
guing that federal courts have the authority "to formulate federal common law rules in the absence of a statu-
tory rule" in cases involving "interstate controversies").
76 See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22
(1995).
77 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
78 Id. at 401.
79 See Act to Amend the Sugar Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 86-592, 74 Stat. 330 (1960).
80 See Proclamation No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (July 8, 1960).
81 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401. The Court noted that, "although a system of compensation was for-
mally provided [for under the law,] the possibility of payment under it may well be deemed illusory." Id.
82 Id. at 404-05.
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fused to transfer payment to the nominee, and instead proposed to pay the
price to C.A.V.83 The bank then brought suit in federal district court for
conversion of the bills of lading.84 Both the district court and the court of
appeals held that the Cuban expropriation violated international law and
therefore did not convey good title.85
The Supreme Court reversed. Applying the "act of state doctrine,"
which "in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country
from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sov-
ereign power committed within its own territory,"86 the Court held that
the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within
its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by
this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges
that the taking violates customary international law.87
The Court stressed that, even though the case sounded in diversity ju-
risdiction, none of state law,88 international law,89 or the Constitution com-
pelled it to apply the "act of state" doctrine.9 ° Although the Court noted that
its "conclusions might well be the same whether we dealt with this problem
as one of state law ... or federal law," it held that "an issue concerned with
a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and
the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law."'" The "problems" posed by the case were "uniquely federal in
nature. If... state courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the pur-
poses behind the doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had
been no federal pronouncement on the subject."" The Court therefore dis-
tinguished Erie:
It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act of state
doctrine in mind when it decided [Erie]. Soon thereafter, Professor Philip C.
Jessup, now a judge of the International Court of Justice, recognized the poten-
tial dangers were Erie extended to legal problems affecting international rela-
83 Id. at 405-06.
84 Id. at 406.
85 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afl'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.
1962).
86 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401.
87 Id at 428.
88 Id at421.
89 Id; accord W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990) (noting
that act of state doctrine derives from concerns for separation of powers, not from principles of international
law).
90 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
91 Id at 425 (citation omitted).
92 Id at 424.
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tions. He cautioned that rules of international law should not be left to diver-
gent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. His basic rationale is equally
applicable to the act of state doctrine.93
The Court analogized this use of federal common law to other "en-
claves of federal judge-made law which bind the States" that "have been
thought by this Court to be necessary to protect uniquely federal interests."94
It cited Clearfield Trust in support of this proposition but thought that the
best analogy was to "the bodies of law applied between States over bounda-
ries and in regard to the apportionment of interstate waters." 95 Because
"[t]he problems surrounding the act of state doctrine are, albeit for different
reasons, as intrinsically federal as are those involved in water apportion-
ment or boundary disputes,... [the] scope of the act of state doctrine must
be determined according to federal law."96 The lone dissent in the case, au-
thored by Justice White, did not dispute that, in the absence of an act of
Congress, federal common law governs in this area.97
Four years later, Zschernig v. Miller9 affirmed the supremacy of fed-
eral law in the area of foreign relations. Zschernig invalidated an Oregon
statute that, as applied, prevented foreigners from inheriting if their home
country did not recognize reciprocal inheritance rights for United States
citizens.99 The Court declared that the statute was "an intrusion by the State
into the field of foreign affairs,"'' 0 and that such an intrusion was inadmis-
sible because "[t]he statute as construed seems to make unavoidable judicial
criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our
own."'' The statute as applied did, "indeed, illustrate the dangers which
are involved if each State, speaking through its probate courts, is permitted
to establish its own foreign policy."'0 2
Zschernig did not itself create federal common law; it did, however,
recognize that state law "must bow to superior federal policy."'0 3 That pol-
93 Id. at 425 (citation and footnote omitted).
94 Id. at 426.
95 Id. The Court specifically cited and discussed Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), in making its analogy.
96 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 (citing "constitutional and statutory provisions [that] indirectly support this
determination"). Ultimately, Congress enacted the Hickenlooper Amendment, which changed the result an-
nounced in Sabbatino. On remand, the district court and court of appeals applied the statute and entered
judgment in favor of the American defendant over the Cuban bank's objection that the "act of state" doctrine
was the law of the case. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
97 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 439 (White, J., dissenting).
98 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
99 ld. at 432.
1o Id.
1o Id. at 440.
102 Id. at 441.
103 Id.
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icy can be established by federal treaty, as in Zschernig,"° or by federal
statute, as the Court has later recognized." 5 But Zschernig was clear that
state laws could also conflict with "federal policy" that was not legislatively
determined; state law needed to give way as long as the state law might
"disturb foreign relations.' '0 6 In determining the content of those relations
and the potential for state law to disturb them, the Court seems engaged in a
form of federal common lawmaking.
The most recent Restatement of Foreign Relations Law confirms the
supremacy of federal common law (in the absence of a federal treaty or
statute) in matters of foreign relations. Section 112 provides, in relevant
part, that "[t]he determination and interpretation of international law present
federal questions and their disposition by the United States Supreme Court
is conclusive for other courts in the United States."' °7 The comments to that
section explain, "The conclusive authority of the United States Supreme
Court to determine and interpret international law for all courts in the
United States derives from the character of that law as federal law."'0 8
D. Admiralty
Admiralty is one of the most difficult areas of federal common law-
making to understand. Today, there is a well-established "tradition of fed-
eral common lawmaking in admiralty."'0 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has held that any state rule that governs an incident of maritime law is inva-
lid if it "works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the gen-
eral maritime law.""' The exact matters that fall within the area of federal
common lawmaking, however, are not clear. As the Court itself has recog-
nized, "It would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from
impermissible state regulation is readily discernable in our admiralty juris-
prudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent within our admiralty juris-
prudence.""'..
Perhaps the best way to make sense of the scope of admiralty law is to
examine the background of the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal
104 Id (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961)).
105 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 n.6 (2000).
106 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 112 (1987).
108 Id§ 112 cmt. a.
109 Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994); see also Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun,
516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996) (explaining that "the general maritime law" is "a species of judge-made federal
common law"); Nw. Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1981) ("We consistently
have interpreted the grant of general admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts as a proper basis for the de-
velopment ofjudge-made rules of maritime law.").
110 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
"'I Miller, 510 U.S. at 452; see also Calhoun, 516 U.S. at 210 n.8.
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courts." 2 In a report prepared for the House of Representatives of the first
Congress, then-Attorney General Edmund Randolph explained that "admi-
ralty" included at least four different categories of disputes: the "con-
demn[ation of] all lawful prizes in time of war," prosecutions under the
"criminal sea law," "offenses on water against the revenue laws," and
"claims for specific satisfaction on the body of a vessel, as for mariners'
wages, &c.""' 3 Randolph's understanding of the content of admiralty law
tracks that of the original draft of the Virginia Plan, which he presented to
the Constitutional Convention. That plan split the jurisdictional head of
admiralty into three separate grants of jurisdiction: "all piracies & felonies
on the high seas, captures from an enemy, [and] cases .. which respect the
collection of the National revenue.""..4 As one author has explained:
The Convention was initially unable to agree upon a specific delineation of
federal jurisdiction and referred the matter to the Committee of Detail. The
Committee "opted for a general admiralty clause and rejected the drafting
strategy of breaking admiralty jurisdiction into subcategories." Randolph's
Report indicates that the effect of the Committee's approach was to expand
federal admiralty jurisdiction beyond the three categories of cases set forth in
the Virginia Plan to encompass "claims for specific satisfaction on the body of
a vessel, as for mariners' wages, &c." as well." 5
Of these four species of admiralty cases, two can be disregarded for
present purposes. First, given the Supreme Court's subsequent refusal to
generate a federal common law of crimes,"6 the piracy and felony cases are
no longer a permissible subject for federal common lawmaking. The reve-
nue cases are also unimportant here, as they would be duplicative of the
cases in which the United States or one of its agencies is a party-an en-
clave of lawmaking power discussed earlier."7 Consequently, to understand
the scope of federal common lawmaking in admiralty, only those cases in
112 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend... to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction.").
113 H.R. REP. No. 1-17 pt. 1 (Dec. 31, 1790), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MISCELLANEOUS 21, 21-22 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
Randolph's understanding of the four forms of admiralty jurisdiction was "more than an idiosyncratic in-
sight." William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers,
and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 117, 128 (1993). Professor Casto argues, however, that the first three
categories of "public" cases were regarded as far more fundamental and important than the last category of
"private" cases. Id.
114 JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in I THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 17, 22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
115 Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1245,
1333 n.421 (1996) (citation omitted).
116 See, e.g., United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (finding that the "exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common-law
cases" is not within the power of the federal courts).
117 See supra Part II.A.
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the first and last categories identified by Randolph, commonly referred to as
"prize" and "instance" cases, respectively,"8 need be examined.
1. Prize Cases.-As an adjunct of American wartime policy, prize
cases were "arguably the most important cases within the federal courts'
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction because they had the greatest potential
to affect the public peace."" 9 According to Professor Clark:
Under the law of nations, when two powers were at war, each had the right to
make prizes of the ships, goods, and effects of the other acquired by capture at
sea. As a means of augmenting their military forces, countries encouraged
privateers to capture enemy vessels by permitting them to "obtain title to the
seized property, ship, and cargo, through judicial condemnation carried out by
an admiralty court." Thus, prize courts played an essential role in encouraging
such captures. Facilitating captures was not the only function of prize courts.
Equally important was the prize courts' power "to regulate the adventurers and
to remedy their abuses.2
Thus, as Justice Story noted in his Commentaries, prize courts functioned to
"restore property upon an illegal capture," to "afford ... adequate redress
for the wrong," and to "punish the aggressor.' 1112  Without such a guarantee,
frictions with foreign powers might increase-a disastrous possibility at a
time when the fledgling country's survival depended on avoidance of frac-
tious foreign entanglements. Leaving prize cases to state courts was not at
all desirable, as "the peace of the whole nation might be put at hazard at any
time by the misconduct of one of its members.' 1 22 For that reason, even the
Articles of Confederation government, which had no general judicial
power, enjoyed jurisdiction over "appeals in all cases of capture.' '1 23
The decision in The Pacquete Habana, The Lola14 is a good example
of how the courts have handled common lawmaking in prize cases. The
Pacquete Habana, The Lola involved appeals in two cases, arising during
the Spanish-American War, in which a lower federal court had "con-
118 Admiralty courts were called "prize courts" when hearing questions involving "revising the acts of
the sovereign himself, performed through the agency of his officers or subjects" and "instance courts" when
hearing "mere questions... arising between individuals." Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 282-83
(1808) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
119 Clark, supra note 115, at 1334.
120 Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
121 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 866 (Ronald D.
Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987) (1833).
122 Id.; cf La Amistad de Rues, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 385, 390-91 (1820) (arguing that the absence of
"neutral prize tribunals" would create "irrationalities and animosities, and very soon embark neutral nations
in all the controversies and hostilities of the conflicting parties"); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
110, 128-29 (1814) ("The rule which we apply to the property of our enemy, will be applied by him to the
property of our citizens.").
123 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, § 1. Trial jurisdiction also existed over "piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas." Id.
124 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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demn[ed]... fishing vessels and their cargoes as prize of war.' ' 25 After the
captured ships had been sold at auction, their owners sued in federal court
to recover the proceeds. 26 The Court, relying on "a rule of international
law ... that coast fishing vessels ... are exempt from capture,' 27 declared
the capture "unlawful."'28 It therefore ordered that "the proceeds of the sale
of the vessel, together with the proceeds of any sale of her cargo, be re-
stored to the claimant, with damages and costs.' 1 29
In explaining why it had resorted to the rule of international law, the
Court stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this
purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commenta-
tors who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat....
This rule of international law is one which prize courts, administering the
law of nations, are bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the
absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation to
the matter. 130
The dissent disagreed on the merits, arguing that there existed no es-
tablished rule of international law and that the executive had the discretion
to prosecute the war without judicial interference. There was no disagree-
ment, however, that the legality of the ships' seizure should be determined,
in the absence of treaty or statute, by federal common law.
A lively debate has recently emerged about whether international law
should be, as a rule, part of federal common law. 3' Whatever the answer to
that question, the Court has in fact exercised federal common lawmaking
125 Id. at 678.
126 Id. at 679.
127 Id. at 708.
128 Id at 714.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 700,708 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 163, 164, 214, 215 (1895)).
131 See Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825-26
(1998) (arguing, without relying on the Constitution, that customary international law is part of federal com-
mon law). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary
international law is not part of federal common law).
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power by looking to customary international law to formulate the federal
common law rule applicable to the cases before it.'
2. Instance Cases.-Instance cases, or admiralty cases dealing with
private maritime claims, 3 3 have evolved dramatically in scope since the in-
ception of the Union. Early in the life of the Nation, this branch of admi-
ralty was seen as comprising only cases involving "contracts and things
exclusively made and done upon the high seas, and to be executed upon the
high seas."'34 According to Professor Clark, two developments during the
nineteenth century expanded the court's federal common lawmaking power
"over private maritime claims. First, the Supreme Court abandoned the nar-
row common-law conception of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction....","'
As early as 1815, in De Lovio v. Boit,'36 Justice Story had argued that "the
delegation of cognizance of 'all civil cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction' to the courts of the United States comprehends all maritime con-
tracts, torts, and injuries."'37 The Court definitively addressed the question
in 1870, when New England Mutual Marine Insurance Co. v. Dunham..
embraced Justice Story's broad construction of admiralty jurisdiction over
private claims.
In the second significant development, "the Court abandoned the tradi-
tional tidewater doctrine, which limited the exercise of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction to matters arising on the high seas or waters within the ebb
and flow of the tide." '39 In The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,"4 the
Court expanded admiralty jurisdiction to include all "public navigable wa-
ter, including lakes and rivers in which there is no tide."'' The combina-
tion of Dunham and Genesee Chief meant that admiralty jurisdiction
extended to contract and tort injuries occurring on any navigable water in
the United States.
The broad expansion of jurisdiction worked by Dunham and Genessee
Chief is especially important because of a third development, Southern Pa-
132 But see Clark, supra note 115, at 1340 (arguing that "the international law rules applied in cases like
The Pacquete Habana do not constitute federal common law. Rather, federal courts apply such rules in order
to implement the exclusive power of the political branches to conduct foreign relations."). This argument,
however, seems only to relocate the courts' lawmaking power to the international relations enclave discussed
supra Part II.C.
133 As one Justice once observed, these claims constitute "mere questions of meum and tuum arising be-
tween individuals." Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241,282 (1808) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
134 De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418,426 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
135 Clark, supra note 115, at 1341-42.
136 7 F. Cas. at 426.
137 Id. at 444 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 89).
138 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870).
139 Clark, supra note 115, at 1342.
140 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
141 Id. at 457.
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cific Co. v. Jensen.42 Jensen held that, in the absence of a governing fed-
eral statute, the right to create federal common law is coextensive with ad-
miralty jurisdiction. It further held that state law is preempted to the extent
that it "works a material prejudice to the characteristic features of the gen-
eral maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of
that law in its international and interstate relations.' 43
Jensen creates a perplexing relationship between federal common law
and state law. The present statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the
federal courts gives to the district courts "original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of ... [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime ju-
risdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled." 1" This "saving to suitors" clause has been a part of
federal admiralty jurisdiction since its inception in 1789.14' Therefore, suit-
ors enjoy a right to bring any state law claim that they would have had in
state court. Presumably, however, this right is subject to the exception that
the claim cannot be brought if it is preempted under Jensen. Perhaps just
stating the result is enough to demonstrate its vagueness: In the absence of
federal statutory authority, federal common law applies in all private mari-
time claims, but state law claims can also be brought except when they can-
not be brought because federal common law preempts them.
E. "Significant Conflicts" Between "Uniquely Federal Interests"
and the Operation of State Law
Although the four situations described above are the only ones in
which the Supreme Court has posited that federal common law creates an
actionable claim, the Court has observed that there may be other, special
situations in which federal common lawmaking is appropriate. In Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp.,146 the Court recognized one such situation:
when a federal common law defense is necessary to avoid a significant con-
flict between federal interests and the state law that supplies the actionable
claim. In Boyle, the Court recognized the "government contractor de-
fense,"' 147 under which a federal contractor can in some circumstances avoid
state tort liability. The case stemmed from the death of a United States Ma-
rine helicopter copilot, David A. Boyle, who was killed when his helicopter
crashed off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia during a training exercise.
Boyle survived the impact of the crash, but the design of the escape hatch
142 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
143 Id. at 216.
144 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2000).
145 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2000)).
146 487 U.S. 500 (1988). One of the Authors of this Article served in the Justice Department and com-
mented on memoranda that preceded the government's brief in Boyle.
147 Id. at 503.
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prevented him from escaping the helicopter. As a result, he drowned. 4 '
His father brought an action against the Sikorsky Division of United Tech-
nologies Corporation, which had manufactured the helicopter under a con-
tract with the United States government. The complaint alleged, inter alia,
that the hatch was defectively designed. In defense, Sikorsky argued that
because it had manufactured the hatch in accordance with government
specifications, it could not be held responsible for the damage.'49 The
threshold issue in the case was whether federal common law, rather than
state law, should be used to fashion a "government contractor defense."
The Court began by observing that it had, "[i]n most fields of activity,
... refused to find federal pre-emption of state law in the absence of either
a clear statutory prescription or a direct conflict between federal [statutory]
and state law."' 5° Nevertheless, the Court admitted:
[A] few areas, involving "uniquely federal interests," . . . are so committed by
the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law
is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content pre-
scribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called "federal
common law."''
The Court decided that the case invoked such "uniquely federal interests"
because it involved "the civil liabilities arising out of the performance of
federal procurement contracts.' ' 2 It explained:
[It] is plain that the Federal Government's interest in the procurement of
equipment is implicated by suits such as the present one--even though the dis-
pute is one between private parties. It is true that where "litigation is purely
between private parties and does not touch the rights and duties of the United
States,". . . federal law does not govern.... But the same is not true here. The
imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms
of Government contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufacture the
design specified by the Government, or it will raise its price. Either way, the
interests of the United States will be directly affected. '
The Court thought, however, that the existence of uniquely federal in-
terests was, by itself, an insufficient reason to create federal common law.
Joined with uniquely federal interests, the Court must find "'a significant
conflict' . . . between an identifiable 'federal policy and the [operation] of
state law,' . . . or [that] the application of state law 'would frustrate specific
objectives' of federal legislation."' 54 In Boyle the significant conflict arose
148 See id. at 502.
149 See id. at 502-03.
150 Id. at 504 (citations omitted).
I51 d. (citation omitted).
152 Id. at 505-06.
153 Id. at 506-07 (citation omitted).
154 Id at 508 (citations omitted; first word substitution in original).
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because the lawsuit indirectly challenged design decisions of military per-
sonnel who were themselves shielded from suit for their decisions by fed-
eral legislation-the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 55 To permit liability against the contractor while insulating the
government from liability "makes little sense"; 6 contractors would ulti-
mately pass the costs of judgments back to the government through higher
contract prices, and state law would force the government to pay indirectly
for damages that Congress had forbidden directly.'57 Thus, the Court con-
cluded, creation of federal common law was appropriate. 5 '
In relation to the earlier enclaves, Boyle presents several challenges
and opportunities. Unlike prior areas, Boyle does not establish a new claim,
but rather engrafts a federal defense onto a state law claim. The fine-tuning
or leveling of varying state products liability laws to create a modicum of
national uniformity is a new use of federal common law-and one that the
Court neither remarks upon nor justifies.
Moreover, Boyle makes more difficult the maintenance of the "en-
clave" theory of federal common law. Although it skirts the edges of the
"United States as party" and admiralty enclaves, Boyle fits squarely within
none of the traditional four categories. Indeed, Justice Brennan in dissent
defended the enclave theory against this interloper,'59 but the majority re-
fused to engage him on the point. Either the enclave theory must be ex-
panded to include a new category-and a defensive one at that-or it must
be regarded as a failure. If the former is true, then some account of that ex-
pansion must be assayed.
F. Preclusion
Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.6 ° represents the
Court's most recent effort to create federal common law. The plaintiff,
Semtek, brought suit in California state court, alleging various state law
claims. The defendant, Lockheed, removed the case to federal court in
California. Holding that California's statute of limitations barred Semtek's
claims, the federal court dismissed the claims "in [their] entirety on the
155 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000) (precluding liability against the United States on "any claim ...
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government"). The Court thought that "the selection of
the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary
function within the meaning of this provision." Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
156 Id. at 512.
157 Id. at 511-12.
158 In a subsequent part of the opinion, the Court held that the government contractor defense contained
three elements: "(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment con-
formed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the
use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States." Id. at 512.
159 Id. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
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merits and with prejudice."'' Because of Maryland's longer statute of limi-
tations, Semtek then refiled the case in Maryland state court. Lockheed re-
sponded both by asking the federal court in California to enjoin the
Maryland lawsuit under the All Writs Act,'62 and by removing the Maryland
case to federal court. Both maneuvers failed.'63  But the Maryland trial
court did ultimately grant judgment for Lockheed on the theory that the
California federal judgment operated as claim preclusion over Semtek's
Maryland case. That judgment was affirmed on appeal. "
The difficulty in the Maryland case was that, under California law, a
dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds was not claim-preclusive of a
later case filed within an appropriate statute of limitations. Had the case
remained in California state court and been dismissed there, the Maryland
courts would have been required to give the same effect to the judgment as
a California state court would have.'65 In other words, the Maryland court
would have been required to hear the case under the longer statute of limita-
tions. Because the case had been dismissed by a federal and not a state
court in California, however, the Maryland appellate court came to the op-
posite conclusion. Its rationale was that the preclusive effect of judgments
entered in federal court is governed by federal, not state, law, and federal
preclusion law bars further proceedings on a claim dismissed "on the mer-
its"--a phrase that includes a claim barred on statute-of-limitations
grounds.'66 Because no federal statute addressed the preclusive effect of a
federal judgment, the federal law on which the appellate court relied was
federal common law.
Had Semtek's case been based on federal law, this rationale might
have passed without much controversy, but the power of a federal court to
specify a federal rule of preclusion for a claim grounded on state law was
debatable. The case first required the Court to navigate the Scylla of prece-
dent and the Charybdis of Erie and the Rules Enabling Act. A decision in
161 Id. at 499.
162 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000). On the use of the All Writs Act to enjoin related litigation, see In re Diet
Drugs, 282 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2002), and In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985). See also
In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 345 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146 (D. Mass. 2004), stay of injunction
pending appeal denied, No. 04-2693 (1st Cir. Jan. 21, 2005), appeal dismissed, No. 04-2693 (1st Cir. Jul. 1,
2005); cf Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002) (noting that All Writs Act does not pro-
vide federal jurisdiction to remove cases subject to anti-suit injunction to federal court); Chick Kam Choo v.
Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988) (noting that Anti-Injunction Act permits injunction against state court pro-
ceedings in some situations). One of the Authors of this Article wrote the district court and appellate briefs in
support of the injunction in the Lupron case.
163 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500.
164 Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 736 A.2d 1104 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), cert. denied,
742 A.2d 521 (Md. 1999).
165 See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1; Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N. Car. Life & Accident & Health
Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691 (1982); 18B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
4467 (2d ed. 2002).
166 Semtek, 736 A.2d at 1108-09.
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1875, Dupasseur v. Rochereau,167 clearly decided the matter in favor of the
use of the California, rather than a federal, rule of claim preclusion in diver-
sity cases, but Dupasseur had been decided during the ascendancy of the
Conformity Act of 1872.168 That Act required each federal court hearing an
action at law to adopt the procedures of the state in which it sat. The Con-
formity Act was superceded by the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,169 which
authorized the creation of federal rules of procedure. Hence, Dupasseur's
continuing vitality was suspect.
Indeed, one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(b),
seemed to cover the preclusive effect of federal judgments. Rule 41(b)
states that, with limited exceptions not involved in Semtek, a dismissal "op-
erates as an adjudication upon the merits."'70 Read broadly but not unnatu-
rally, this language specifies a federal rule of claim preclusion for all
federal judgments. But such a reading, the Court thought, brought Rule
4 1(b) into tension with the limitation the Rules Enabling Act imposes on all
valid Federal Rules-that they "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right."'' "[I]t would be peculiar to find a rule governing the ef-
fect that must be accorded federal judgments by other courts ensconced in
rules governing the internal procedures of the rendering court itself."'72 Im-
plicit but never expressly stated in the Court's reasoning is the premise that
rules of claim preclusion are substantive rather than procedural in nature.
The powerlessness of the Federal Rules to establish a federal rule of
claim preclusion for federal judgments was bolstered "in many cases" by
"the federalism principle of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins."'73 The different
claim preclusion rules in a state court in California and a federal court in
California would likely induce out-of-state defendants to remove cases filed
in state court in order to obtain the broader federal rule. The attempt to
eliminate "'substantial variations [in outcomes] between state and federal
167 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1875).
168 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (1873).
169 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077
(2000)).
170 FED. R. Ctv. P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) states in full:
(b) Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against the defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of juris-
diction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon
the merits.
171 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).
172 Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001).
173 Id. at 504. Because a power to declare a rule of claim preclusion seems to be inherent in the right to
create the substantive obligation itself, it is not evident that Erie, which concerns primarily diversity cases,
prevents the use of a federal rule of claim preclusion for cases based on federal law. This fact likely explains
the "in many cases" qualification the Court placed on its Erie analysis, See id. at 504-05 (addressing the
claim-preclusive effect of Rule 41 (b) in federal-question cases).
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litigation' which would '[Il]ikely ... influence the choice of a forum"' was
one of the essential concerns of Erie.74
Interpreting Rule 41(b) in light of these concerns, the Court found that
the preclusive effect of the "upon the merits" language of Rule 41(b) ex-
tended only to a second suit filed in the same court as the first case. There-
fore, had Semtek re-filed its case in the same federal court in California,
Rule 41(b) would have prevented that court from entertaining the case.
Rule 41(b) did not, however, prevent a different federal or state court from
entertaining the case.
Having eschewed reliance on either Dupasseur or Rule 41(b)-two
lifelines tethered to opposite shores-the Court remained adrift in its effort
to find the source of law that might provide a principle to determine the
preclusive effect of the federal judgment. Enter federal common law. With
little discussion, the Court declared that "federal common law governs the
claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diver-
sity."'75 The Court's primary argument for its holding was to cite several of
its prior federal-question cases in which the Court had applied a non-textual
federal rule of preclusion. From these cases the Court distilled the principle
that "[s]tates cannot give those [federal-question] judgments merely what-
ever effect they would give their own judgments, but must accord them the
effect that this Court prescribes."' 76 Over the next several sentences, the
Court emphasized the point twice more: The preclusive effect that state
courts give to federal judgments "is by direction of this Court, which has
the last word on the claim-preclusive effect of all federal judgments,"'77 and
the deference to state law in Dupasseur "was the federal rule that this Court
deemed appropriate."'7 8 Obviously, to claim the authority is not to justify
it, and an ipse dixit quality hangs over Semtek. 179
174 Id. at 504 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965) (alterations and ellipsis in origi-
nal)).
17 Id at 508.
176 Id. at 507.
7 d.
178 Id. at 508. It is interesting to note that, in this account of Dupasseur, the Court rejected the influence
of the Conformity Act of 1872 on the decision. Earlier in its opinion, however, the Court relied on the Con-
formity Act as its main reason for not adhering to the Dupasseur holding. See supra note 168 and
accompanying text.
179 The issue of whether federal law provided the rule of preclusion in these cases had long divided the
academy. Compare Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976) (arguing for a
federal rule of claim preclusion on the theory that the court system which renders a judgment should be able
to prescribe the preclusive effect of that judgment), and Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion,
96 MICH. L. REv. 945 (1998) (stating that federal common law applies), with Stephen B. Burbank, Inerijuris-
dictional Preclusion and Federal Common Law: Toward a General Approach, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 625
(1985) (arguing that federal common law applies, but that, in shaping this law, federal courts should generally
borrow state preclusion rules). Professor Burbank has written a post-Semtek coda, applauding aspects of
Semtek but arguing that the Court's approach "is, if not the wrong rule, then not quite the right rule." Stephen
A Theory of Federal Common Law
The Court then adopted the following rule of preclusion for diversity
cases: Federal courts should apply the rule of preclusion that a state court
sitting in the same state as the federal court that rendered the judgment
would have applied. Thus, the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered in a
federal court in California is the same as the preclusive effect of a Califor-
nia state judgment entered in identical circumstances; and since California
did not extend preclusive effect to dismissals on the statute-of-limitation
grounds, the Maryland courts could not extend preclusive effect to the
judgment either. As a result, the judgment of the Maryland court against
Semtek was reversed, and its case reinstated. 0
Semtek raises a number of important thematic issues. The first is its
incorporation of state law as the federal rule of decision. Erie-like concerns
heavily influenced the decision to incorporate state law; in particular, the
court wanted to make uniform the preclusive effect of judgments rendered
in state and federal courts to prevent the "'forum shopping ... and ... in-
equitable administration of the laws that Erie seeks to avoid."'' The Court
saw "no conceivable federal interest in giving that time bar more effect in
other courts than the California courts themselves would impose."' 82 It did,
however, recognize that it would not refer to state law "in situations in
which the state law is incompatible with federal interests" 83-- a phrase
reminiscent of the "significant conflict" language of Boyle'84 and a reminder
that any adequate account of federal common law must address the incorpo-
ration of state law as the federal rule of decision.
Second, Semtek uses federal common law to address procedural mat-
ters. The story of federal common law is often told as one of federal sub-
stantive law supplanting state substantive law in discrete enclaves.
Procedural law, however, typically operates across substantive categories,
so it is no longer possible after Semtek to imagine federal common law as
being confined to certain substantive categories. Nor can we see the power
to create federal procedural common law simply as a necessary implication
of federal substantive law, because Semtek involved state substantive law.
Semtek forces the creation of a richer account of federal common law.
Finally, and most problematically, Semtek's form of federal common
law comes into being only because federal courts and federal diversity ju-
risdiction exist. Other categories of federal common law existed independ-
ently of the court that applied the law; for instance, state courts must apply
the federal law of international or interstate relations. In contrast, the need
B. Burbank, Semtek Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1039
(2002).
180 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509.
181 Id. at 508-09 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,468 (1965) (ellipses in original).
182 Id at 509.
183 Id.
184 See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
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for a federal law of claim preclusion arises from our structure of federal and
state courts; without federal courts, the law of California would have ap-
plied to determine the preclusive effect of a California state-court judgment
decided under California law. 8' Therefore, an adequate theory must ex-
plain the development of federal common law that operates in and owes its
existence to the federal courts sitting in diversity-something that Erie had
seemingly abolished generations ago.
III. THE INADEQUACIES OF PRESENT THEORIES
Although the Supreme Court has never suggested a coherent, unifying
rationale for the enclaves of federal common law,'86 the academic literature
has constructed an array of theories. Analytically the theories can be
grouped into three categories: those that deny entirely the legitimacy of
federal common law; those that see the scope of federal common law as far
vaster than its present use, with judicial discretion serving as the only sig-
nificant limitation on judicial lawmaking; and those that stake out an inter-
mediate position accepting the legitimacy of federal common law but
suggesting significant, principled limits on the power of courts to create it.
Each theory has important gaps.
A. Theories of Illegitimacy
A handful of commentators deny the legitimacy of any federal com-
mon law. 1"7 Armed with the ambiguous phrasing of the Rules of Decision
Act' and the political truism that, in a democracy, the creation of law
should be left to the political branches of government, they believe that
courts do not have the institutional competence to make federal common
185 The result is less clear for federal question claims adjudicated in state courts. See SHAPIRO, supra
note 36, at 137-40; 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 165, §§ 4467-4468. Whether a federal common law of
preclusion or a state law of preclusion applies in this scenario does not, however, matter for present purposes;
the critical issue is that, in at least some cases, the presence of federal courts results in the creation of federal
common law that was otherwise nonexistent.
186 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
187 Among those opposing any creation of federal common law are Professors Merrill and Redish.
Merrill, supra note 39; Merrill, supra note 61; MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 119-48 (2d ed. 1990); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Po-
litical Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761
(1989) [hereinafter Redish, Federal Common Law]. For a more limited argument that admiralty and perhaps
foreign relations should not be judged under the standards of federal common law, see Ernest A. Young, It's
Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 469 (2004).
188 The Rules of Decision Act was originally found in section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. With modest changes, it survives today and provides that: "The
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Con-
gress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of
the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). Professor Redish grounds his
objection to federal common law on this statute, rather than on constitutional concerns for separation of
powers or federalism. See Redish, Federal Common Law, supra note 187.
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law. 89  Sometimes blended into this argument is a concern for federalism.
Federal common law displaces state law, and thus shifts the balance of
power from state to federal government. Because federal common law also
creates federal subject matter jurisdiction, 90 it shifts power from state to
federal courts. When the case remains in state court, it also creates the odd
political circumstance of state courts creating federal law' 91-something
that state legislatures surely could not do. Indeed, the combined gravita-
tional force of statutory, separation of powers, and federalism considera-
tions seems so great that it is difficult to believe that any actual instances of
federal common law have escaped their pull.
But escape they have. And therein lies the fatal flaw in the abolitionist
stance against federal common law. Whatever the normative merit of this
stance, the stubborn reality is that federal common law exists and is expand-
ing. So far, the republic has not fallen. It could be argued that federal
common law is a slow-growing cancer that must be cut out before it metas-
tasizes to the central organs of democracy. But that claim works best if we
assume that federal common law has no internal principle of limitation-
that courts can and will make federal common law to the full extent of the
federal lawmaking power.
The normative merit of the abolitionist position is also uncertain. First,
the Rules of Decision Act is a markedly vague basis for asserting the ille-
gitimacy of federal common law. The instruction that federal courts must
apply the "laws of the several states . . . in cases where they apply" is a tau-
tology.'92 Recent scholarship suggests that, when originally enacted, the
"laws of the several states" referred to a kind of general American law that
operated independently of the law of any state or of the English common
law."' In other words, at least insofar as it involved nonstatutory law, Swift
189 Professor Field disputes the idea that separation of powers concerns have any direct effect on limiting
the use of federal common law. She acknowledges, however, an indirect effect. Federal lawmaking sup-
plants state lawmaking, and states are protected from excessive federal lawmaking by the manner in which
Article I of the Constitution structures Congress. Federal common law bypasses this check on federal power.
See Field, supra note 14, at 931-33. Other commentators perceive a direct separation of powers challenge to
judicial lawmaking. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 6.1, at 356-58.
190 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
191 For an example of a state court extending and applying Boyle's government contractor defense, see
Silverstein v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 842 A.2d 881 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004); cf Bellia, supra note 8
(discussing constraints on state courts in creating federal common law).
192 Weinberg, supra note 40, at 816 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000)). For an attempt to rescue the Act
from the tautology, see Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory. A Re-
sponse to Professor Weinberg, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 853, 854-56 (1989).
193 See RITZ, supra note 9, at 126-48; Borchers, supra note 9. As Professor Ritz puts it:
American law is to be found in the "laws of the several states" viewed as a group of eleven states
in 1789, and not viewed separately and individually. It is not a direction to apply the law of a par-
ticular state, for if it had been so intended, the section would have referred to the "laws of the re-
spective states."
RITZ, supra note 9, at 148.
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v. Tyson might well have interpreted the Rules of Decision Act correctly; 94
Erie had it wrong. A final problem with the Rules of Decision Act, as Pro-
fessor Weinberg states, is that it applies only to federal courts-and there-
fore ironically leaves state courts free to fashion federal common law."9 ' It
is unlikely that a statute intended to ban any federal common law would
take such a form.
Second, the extent of the federal common law's affront to the concerns
for separation of powers and federalism often lies in the eye of the be-
holder.'96 Courts with common lawmaking power were hardly unfamiliar to
the framers of the Constitution.'97 As an a priori matter, it is far from clear
that an absolute prohibition on, as opposed to a tailored authorization of,
federal common law is the appropriate response to these concerns. Nor
have these concerns led the Supreme Court to reject all federal common
law. Indeed, distinguished commentators find explicit and implicit authori-
zation for federal common law in the same Constitution from which the
concerns for separation of powers and federalism derive.'98
In a country with a centuries-old common law tradition, the claim that
courts lack the institutional or constitutional competence to create federal
common law is too weak to be sustained in its strongest form. But the abo-
litionists issue an important challenge to anyone advocating federal com-
mon law: Find a theory of federal common law with sufficient strength to
justify the antidemocratic and antifederalist impulses of judicial lawmaking.
B. Theories of Broad Power and Discretion
On the other shore of the debate over federal common law are com-
mentators who posit a subterranean reservoir-in some formulations, quite
a vast reservoir-of federal common law. The reservoir encompasses, de-
pending on the precise theory, either those matters in which existing federal
legislation or activity evinces a particular federal interest,'99 all matters of
194 Professor Ritz's interpretation suggests that federal courts were also free to disregard state statutory
law when applying "the laws of the several states." RITZ, supra note 9, at 148. Swift had held that federal
courts were required to follow state statutory law. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842).
195 Weinberg, supra note 40, at 817-18. In responding to Professor Weinberg, Professor Redish, whose
argument against federal common law hinges entirely on the Rules Enabling Act, fails to address this point.
Redish, supra note 192; see also Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks
Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 860 (1989) (further developing her critique of the Rules
of Decision Act as an argument against federal common law).
196 Cf CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 6.1, at 358 ("[N]either value provides any clear guidance as to
when federal courts should create or refrain from creating federal common law.").
197 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 537-38; THE FEDERALIST No. 83
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 563-64; cf U.S. CoNST. amend. VII (permitting reexamination of a
jury's factual findings only "according to the rules of the common law").
198 See infra notes 201, 220-226, 238-241 and accompanying text.
199 Mishkin, supra note 10.
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national import,2°0 or, most broadly, all matters on which Congress permis-
sibly could legislate but has not.20 ' According to these theories, federal
common law has bubbled to the surface from this reservoir in certain en-
claves and not in others. The potential application of federal common law
is great, even if its actual usage is more modest. 2 2
In these theories, the critical question is one of discretion, not power.
The power to create federal common law is a given. But courts need not
exercise the full scope of that power. The usual task of such theories is to
sketch the relevant factors that do, or should, guide courts' discretion.
The most notable efforts are those of Professors Field and Weinberg.
Professor Field suggests four factors: the need for national uniformity, the
presence of the United States as a party, the presence of well-developed
state law and the need for uniformity within a state, and the feasibility of
judicial lawmaking in light of the relative capacity of courts and legislatures
to declare a particular rule.20 3 Professor Weinberg does not detail factors as
such, but suggests a "clusters of ideas that are important to a clarified mod-
em understanding of federal common law."' "' Among these ideas are a le-
gitimate national interest; federalism; a proper historical understanding of
Erie and federal common law; the supremacy of inchoate national policy in
relation to the protection of traditional state governance of an issue; the (of-
ten misguided) exercise of judicial restraint in making law; separations of
powers; legislative intent; and "the new politics" (i.e., the political goals of
judges both in terms of judicial restraint versus activism and in terms of lib-
eral versus conservative substantive policy preferences).2 °5  Professor
Weinberg's exposition of her guidelines leads her to argue for an expansive
creation of federal common law. In contrast, even though she rejects the
limiting notion of "enclaves," Professor Field suggests that her factors
counsel restrained use of federal common law. In her judgment, application
of the factors boils down to a simple principle: "[F]ederal rules will be
made when there is a need for national uniformity that outweighs the need
for uniformity within a state; or when national interests require. But state
200 Weinberg, supra note 40, at 805, 809, 851 (arguing that "there are no fundamental constraints on the
fashioning of federal rules of decision" except for a "cluster of ideas" that help a court to determine whether
"national substantive policy is, on balance, thought to be better served" by federal common law).
201 Field, supra note 14, at 887 ("[T]he only limitation on courts' power to create federal common law is
that the court must point to a federal enactment, constitutional or statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the
federal common law rule."); id. at 924 (suggesting "that federal courts can make rules in the first instance
whenever Congress has power to act but has not acted"); id. at 927-30 (stating that, due to Erie, neither Arti-
cle III's grant of diversity jurisdiction nor the Rules of Decision Act can be interpreted to authorize federal
common law).
202 See id. at 888.
203 Id. at 953-62.
204 Weinberg, supra note 40, at 809.
205 Id. at 809-51.
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law should apply whenever that result is not inconsistent with federal pur-
poses."2 °6
The immediate problem with broad permissive theories is evident:
They threaten to undermine separation of powers and federalism con-
straints on judicial power. Even if these concerns should not lead to out-
right rejection of federal common law, they should counsel against its
aggressive use. Professor Weinberg in particular seems untroubled by
greater use, but activist judicial behavior is a two-edged sword not always
likely to favor "the way of integrity in forthright decision [and] the way of
narrow holdings.""2 7 The picture of judges creating expansive new fields of
federal law offends the eyes of many beholders, including ourselves, and
only intensifies the desire to find significant, principled limitations on fed-
eral common law.
The need for uniformity is the principal limitation that Professor Field
suggests; Professor Weinberg appears to agree.0 But a need for uniformity
seems inadequate to the tasks of explaining and reining in federal common
law. For instance, uniformity would appear to argue for federal common
law rules in a number of areas in which no federal common law currently
exists-for instance, in criminal law2 9 and environmental law.E"' All of us
probably have our own favorite areas for which we feel that federal uni-
formity would be especially desirable-for instance, health care, tax policy,
child custody, or product-liability standards.21" ' But federal common law ex-
ists in none of these areas. Uniformity also seems an inadequate explana-
tion of the federal common law of admiralty-especially the instance
cases-given that commerce moving by rail and road is regulated by state
tort and contract law. Nor can uniformity explain Semtek, which potentially
leaves state and federal courts applying different rules of preclusion.
Some of the remaining factors suggested by Professor Field and Pro-
fessor Weinberg-such as the presence of the United States as a party-are
easier to apply than uniformity. But the application of other remaining fac-
tors-such as the relative institutional abilities of courts and legislatures to
206 Field, supra note 14, at 962.
207 Weinberg, supra note 40, at 851.
208 Id. (suggesting that Congress should assure the courts that "the rules of decision are to be uniform
federal ones, where uniformity is needed for either substantive or administrative reasons").
209 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also United States v.
Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816) (following Hudson & Goodwin despite doubts about its holding).
Hudson & Goodwin did allow some criminal common lawmaking, notably in the area of contempt, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) at 34, and that tradition is followed today. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 22, at 689-90.
210 Compare Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (authorizing federal common law in in-
terstate pollution dispute), with Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (stating, in the same dispute, that
subsequent amendments to Federal Water Pollution Control Act were comprehensive enough to eliminate the
use of federal common law).
211 Cf 0'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994) (declining to create a federal common law
defense and describing uniformity as "that most generic ... of alleged federal interests").
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declare law-is destined to devolve into a debate over unprovable political
assertions. Moreover, any broad, multi-factor set of guidelines has an in-
evitable slipperiness to it, even though clarity in lawmaking roles is usually
seen as a benefit. 1 2
The claim of broad lawmaking power also matches up poorly with the
received law, which distinguishes between the first step of lawmaking
power and the second step of discretionary declination of that power. Aca-
demic theories are not, of course, slavishly beholden to courts' reasoning,
and it is undeniably true that the present two-step analysis is inelegant (es-
pecially when the same factors-in particular, the need for uniformity-
seem to inform both the first and the second stages of the inquiry). But
there is a certain wisdom in a process that sets clear limits on judicial law-
making and then engages in a second-stage check that balances the benefits
and costs of judicial lawmaking in case-specific contexts that arise within
those boundaries.
The theory of broad discretionary power fails to match up with the re-
ceived law in another important respect. In a system of broad discretion,
we would expect to see initial instability as lower courts use their discretion
to create a wide array of pockets of federal common law, followed by an ac-
tive dialogue between the district and appellate courts over the proper use of
this discretion, followed by a more stable understanding of discretionary
common law. Nothing like this expectation has occurred. Certainly a few
lower courts have sought to expand the scope of federal common law,2 3 but
in nearly all instances federal common law has been rejected-not by resort
to discretionary considerations but rather because the suggested use failed
to fit within one of the standard enclaves of federal common law.214 Per-
haps the most significant case creating a new kind of federal common law
due to concerns for uniformity is now more than thirty years old, and its re-
sult has been rejected elsewhere. 15 Although it is possible that courts are
212 Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "malleable stan-
dards ... have a way of turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual judges' policy prefer-
ences").
213 See, e.g., Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993); Kohr v. Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737
(E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
214 See, e.g., Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1985); In re "Agent Or-
ange, " 635 F.2d 987.
215 Kohr, 504 F.2d 400 (creating federal common law of contribution in aviation accident). Kohr figures
prominently in Professor Field's theory of federal common law, see Field, supra note 14, at 913-15, but al-
most certainly does not survive the refusal to create a federal common law right of contribution in antitrust
cases. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). But see Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 292 (1993) (creating "ancillary" common law right of contribution
in implied Rule lOb-5 right of action). Indeed, within seven years of Kohr, even the Seventh Circuit did not
think to use federal common law to deal with the complex conundrums of choice of law analysis in an avia-
tion accident. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
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occasionally making new types of federal common law without saying so,"6
and although the received cases cannot alone determine the merits of a legal
theory, the lack of an ongoing, vigorous debate about the shape of the dis-
cretion in federal common lawmaking undercuts the theory of broad power.
Like the abolitionist position, the position favoring broad power seems
difficult to maintain in light of present reality. The defect in the absolute
proscription is that federal common law exists; the defect in the broad pre-
scription is that not much federal common law exists. Nonetheless, just as
the abolitionist proscription raised important federalism and separation of
powers concerns, the broad prescription contains an important truth: that
some circumstances demand a unified national response-even if that re-
sponse is judge-made law. The question is whether any theory can mediate
between these contrasting positions.
C. The Enclave Theories
One way to define federal common law is to describe it as the law
made in certain enclaves.2"7 These discrete enclaves are just that--discrete.
Each enclave is separately and pragmatically justified, and no grand theory
unites them. The best that can be said is that each enclave involves
"uniquely federal interests"2"8 for which federal common law is appropriate.
This approach can be combined with Boyle's "significant conflict" coda" 9
to explain why it is that in some cases (those without a "significant con-
flict"), state law is chosen as the federal rule of decision.
Ultimately, however, labels like "uniquely federal interests" and "sig-
nificant conflict" are conclusions rather than methods of analysis. When
pressed about why these federal interests are so unique (as opposed to envi-
ronmental, telecommunication, financial regulation, and myriad other vital
issues for which no federal common law has yet been developed) or about
why some of the areas included within federal common law are so unique
(for instance, admiralty cases in general, and instance cases in particular),
the pragmatic approach struggles for an answer. One answer is the realist's
view that these are areas in which judges deciding the cases believe that the
balance of state and federal interests tips sharply (or "uniquely") toward
federal common law; nothing more can be said. But in a world in which
federal common law is determined by such balancing, wouldn't we expect
216 Compare In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(Weinstein, J.) (holding that states would look to a "national consensus law" to deal with mass tort product
liability cases arising out of use of herbicides during wartime), with In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Liab.
Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 878 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Weinstein, J.) (refusing to adopt "national consensus law"
to deal with national asbestos liability crisis).
217 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
218 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 640; Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426 (1964).
219 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
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to see a lot more lawyering trying to convince judges of the strong tip of in-
terests toward federal common law? And wouldn't we see more variability
in the cases, as different judges balanced the scales differently?
It is possible to try to put the enclave theory on surer intellectual foot-
ing. The first effort, which we might call the "jurisdictional implication"
theory, is something of a straw man-a position that some who oppose the
enclave theory set up rather than a position that those who believe in it ad-
vocate.220 The theory runs along these lines: One common feature of each
of the four traditional enclaves of federal common law is its textual ground-
ing in one of the nine "Cases" or "Controversies" that constitute Article
III's "judicial Power."22' Thus, common law involving the government is
implicitly authorized by the extension of "judicial Power" to the fourth ju-
risdictional grant: "Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party." '222 Common law in interstate disputes is authorized by the fifth grant
of jurisdiction: "Controversies between two or more States." '223 Common
law in international relations arises from the grant of jurisdiction over the
second and ninth jurisdictional grants: "Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls" '224 and "Controversies . . . between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." '225
Admiralty common law is implicitly authorized by the extension of "judi-
cial Power" to the third jurisdictional grant: "all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction. 226
The notion that jurisdictional grants can contain an implicit power to
create common law has been accepted by the Supreme Court. 27 Thus far,
however, the Court has found only that statutory grants of jurisdiction im-
ply this power. Under the "jurisdictional implication" theory, the constitu-
tional grants of jurisdiction imply the same power. Because the statutory
grants typically encompass only a fraction of the full expanse of the consti-
tutional grants,225 the scope of federal common law rulemaking under this
220 See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 40, at 832-33.
221 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. In fact, courts have never created federal common law to deal with cases affecting ambassadors,
ministers, and consuls because Congress, from the founding of the Republic, has created positive law to de-
fine the rights and liabilities of these foreign dignitaries. See Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 112,
117-18. Cf Clark, supra note 115, at 1311 ("Strictly speaking, 'Cases affecting Ambassadors,' ... are not
governed by federal common law. Rather, such cases are governed by positive federal law .. .
225 U.S. CONST., art. HI, § 2, cl. 1.
226 Id.
227 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (stating that the power to create fed-
eral common law derived from statutory grant ofjurisdiction); FALLON ET AL., supra note 22, at 730-43.
228 Compare, e.g., Osbom v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (stating that con-
stitutional federal question jurisdiction extends to any case in which a federal issue forms an original ingredi-
ent in the case), with Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (stating that statutory grant
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theory could be vast. Indeed, read this broadly, the "jurisdictional implica-
tion" theory converts into Professor Field's theory.229
The theory has other flaws, principally that it proves both too little and
too much. It proves too little because it is a stretch to extract from jurisdic-
tional grant over cases involving ambassadors or the jurisdictional grant
over controversies involving states and their citizens on one side and for-
eign countries and their citizens on the other the greater power to regulate
the field of international relations. The theory proves too much because it
cannot explain why federal common lawmaking is limited just to five juris-
dictional grants, and why it does not extend as well to the remaining four.
Notable among the remaining grants are federal question and diversity.
Begin with the federal-question grant.23 The constitutional grant of
federal-question jurisdiction is usually thought to be very broad."' If this
jurisdictional grant carries the implicit power to create federal common law,
then courts have vast lawmaking authority. One way to avoid this result is
to say that federal common law is constrained by other sources independent
of the "arising under" grant, such as the Interstate Commerce Clause. 32 But
that logic, if extended back to the jurisdictional grants involving the United
States, interstate disputes, controversies involving foreigners, and admi-
ralty, would rob the "jurisdictional implication" theory of its force because
some source other than the jurisdictional grant becomes the true limit of
federal common law. Moreover, this logic cuts as broad a swath for federal
common law as Professor Field's implication theory, which the enclave
theory attempts to narrow.
With respect to the diversity grants, which are found in the sixth, sev-
enth, and eighth grants of federal judicial power,233 a right to create federal
common law is incoherent. Such a power is far greater than that adopted in
Swift v. Tyson, which limited federal common law powers to diversity cases
in federal court; state courts still applied state common law. But modern
of federal question jurisdiction extends only to cases where a federal question is asserted on the face of a
well-pleaded complaint).
229 Professor Kramer has tried to create an "enclave-plus" theory, suggesting that federal common law is
appropriate both when a case falls within an enclave and when additional common law rules "further an un-
derlying federal enactment." Kramer, supra note 75, at 289. The latter half of Professor Kramer's theory fol-
lows Professor Field's theory. See Field, supra note 14.
230 Federal question jurisdiction extends to "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S.
CONST. art. lII, § 2, cl, 1.
231 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738. But see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause ofAction,
89 IOWA L. REv. 777 (2004) (arguing that Osborn should be read more narrowly).
232 U.S. CONST. art. t, § 8, cl. 3.
233 The sixth grant extends federal jurisdiction to "Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of an-
other State," the seventh grant extends jurisdiction to "Controversies . . . between Citizens of different
States," and the eighth extends federal jurisdiction to "Controversies ... between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under the Grants of different States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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federal common law applies in state as well as federal courts. 234 One way to
read Erie is to say that the import of the case is to remove the diversity
grants as a source for creating federal common law.23 5 Thus, Erie permits
reliance only on the nondiversity grants of jurisdiction to create federal
common law.
But that argument cannot work. Erie involved the question of whether
federal courts could create a common law different than the state courts. To
hold that federal courts did not have such power does not answer the ques-
tion of whether the jurisdictional grant provides a common lawmaking
power that both federal and state courts can invoke. Moreover, the claim
for a federal common law of international relations relies heavily on the
ninth jurisdictional grant, the grant of jurisdiction in controversies "between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." '236
But this grant is structurally identical to the sixth and seventh grants, in
which diversity jurisdiction is extended to disputes between a state or its
citizens and another state or its citizens. How some of these parallel provi-
sions can serve as the source of common law rulemaking and others cannot
defies ready explanation.
Assuming that it is worth the effort, one way to try to salvage the "ju-
risdictional implication" theory is to say that the prohibition on creating
federal common law in diversity cases is implicit in the very nature of the
diversity grant. But then we must squarely face another problem: explain-
ing Boyle and Semtek. Both were diversity cases; neither involved the
United States as a party, a suit in admiralty, an interstate dispute, or interna-
tional relations. In both cases, the only font of federal jurisdiction was di-
versity. In one case, the court created a defense to a state law claim, in the
other a procedural rule of preclusion for diversity cases. Therefore, it can-
not legitimately be claimed that the diversity grants prohibit all federal
common lawmaking power in diversity cases.
A final, and probably fatal, flaw in the "jurisdictional implication" the-
ory is the fact that state courts also make and apply federal common law.
Implying a power for federal courts to make law from the jurisdictional
grants of Article III is one matter, but using federal jurisdictional grants to
imply a lawmaking power for state courts is too great a stretch. The equiva-
lent argument would allow state legislatures to establish uniform rules of
naturalization and bankruptcy because Article I gives comparable powers to
the national legislature.237
A second, richer justification for the enclave approach is the "constitu-
tional preemption" theory: that in some enclaves the Constitution preempts
234 For an analysis of state cases applying modem federal common law, see Bellia, supra note 8, at
832-51.
235 This is, for instance, Professor Field's reading. See Field, supra note 14, at 922-23.
236 See supra notes 224-225 and accompanying text.
237 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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state lawmaking, and that, in the absence of congressional action, federal
common law must fill in the gap. Under this view, which was first ad-
vanced by Professor Hill,238 preemption derives from various constitutional
texts, some of which are contained in the Article I powers given to Con-
gress, others of which are contained in the Article II powers given to the
President, and still others contained in the Article III grants of jurisdiction
to federal courts. In some cases, the preemption is express, and in others
implied. Unlike the "jurisdictional implication" theory, the "constitutional
preemption" theory examines the entire Constitution and its structure to de-
lineate areas that are inappropriate for state lawmaking.
The argument has particular force with respect to the law of interna-
tional relations: The perceived weakness of the Articles of Confederation
government in matters of foreign policy;239 the presidential power to com-
mand the armed forces, to negotiate treaties, and to appoint ambassadors;2 40
the congressional power to declare war, ratify treaties, and provide advice
and consent on ambassadors;24' and perhaps even the present status of the
United States as a superpower can reasonably be construed to implicitly
warn states off the field of lawmaking in international affairs. But even
here problems arise. First, implications from constitutional structure are a
dangerous business, in large part because they are implicit and their obvi-
ousness often depends on the eye of the beholder.2 42 Another danger is that
state law has never been made completely irrelevant in matters affecting
foreign affairs; state law can regulate the behavior of foreign nationals and
entities associated with foreign sovereigns.24 3 Moreover, a preemption
analysis simply prevents the states from enacting law; it does not vest
power in the courts to make law. A separate question remains whether the
courts, as opposed to Congress or the President, have the capacity to make
the law that the states do not. Most of the constitutional texts that can be
said to imply that the states have no lawmaking power in matters of interna-
tional relations seem, as a matter of structure, to deny that power to the
courts as well. 2"
238 Hill, supra note 16, at 1025.
239 See THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
240 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1-2.
241 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
242 Cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (5-4 decision) (implying from constitutional structure an
intention not to make states liable for damages suffered by private individuals due to states' violations of
certain federal laws).
243 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2000)); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S.
298 (1994).
244 The one constitutional text provision that might counteract this claim--the power of the federal
courts to entertain claims involving "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls," U.S. CONST. art. Ill,
§ 2, cl. 1-reduces to the claim that federal common lawmaking can be implied from a jurisdictional grant.
The problems of this claim have already been explored. See supra notes 220-236 and accompanying text.
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As we move away from international relations, the argument for pre-
emption of state law weakens. A fair case can be made that state law
should not define the rights and liabilities of the federal sovereign, espe-
cially in light of the belief in current ascendancy that federal law cannot de-
fine certain of the rights and liabilities of state sovereigns.245  But
intermingling the law of state sovereign immunity and federal common law
is a tricky business, especially in light of the exceptions to state immunity
that have no counterpart in the line of cases following Clearfield Trust.
Given the lack of any mention of admiralty other than in the jurisdictional
grant of Article III, the notion that a federal common law of admiralty im-
plicitly preempts state law as a matter of constitutional structure is more
difficult to maintain. 46 The argument that states cannot as a matter of con-
stitutional structure create the law that governs disputes among themselves
is equally difficult to maintain, especially in light of the immediately pre-
ceding claim that the federal government must be able to create the law that
governs its disputes with others.
It is still harder, if not impossible, to reconcile Boyle and Semtek with
the preemption theory, which had been crafted by Professor Hill years be-
fore either decision. What explicit or implicit constitutional text exempts
government contractors from some (but not all) of the workings of state
product-liability law? And it is similarly difficult to craft a plausible argu-
ment that the Constitution's structure requires federal courts to create a fed-
eral rule of preclusion for diversity (i.e., state law) cases.
The preemption theory does not explain why certain constitutional
texts displace state lawmaking and vest power in the courts to create federal
common law, other texts displace all state lawmaking but do not necessarily
permit the creation of federal common law,247 other texts act only to limit
245 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. 706; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The statement in the
text is a bit expansive; as Alden makes clear, states must still obey federal commands, and their failure to do
so can be enforced through any of a number of remedial avenues. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-57. Moreover, in
some situations Congress can constitutionally waive a state's immunity from suit. Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509 (2004); id. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
246 We have already seen that jurisdictional grants, standing alone, provide an insufficient basis to imply
federal common law. See supra notes 220-236 and accompanying text. Professor Hill, the crafter of the
"constitutional preemption" theory, argued for the admiralty enclave solely on the basis of the jurisdictional
grant, not on the basis of any other constitutional texts. Hill, supra note 16, at 1032-35; see Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918) (indicating that state law was preempted in the admiralty area by
Article III); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (same). It could be argued that the combination of the
Commerce Clause, the various clauses affecting foreign relations, and the jurisdictional grant in admiralty
combine to give courts the power to make federal common law. The lack of a comparable jurisdictional
grant would explain why rail or highway transportation does not receive the "benefit" of federal common
law. On such reasoning, however, the Commerce Clause, the various clauses affecting foreign relations, and
the jurisdictional grant in diversity should give courts the power to fashion a general commercial common
law-something that Erie forbids.
247 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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the outer reaches of state lawmaking,248 and still other texts do not limit
state lawmaking at all.
One attempt to salvage the theory, which Professor Hill intimates and
Boyle makes clear, is to explain the preemptive effect of federal common
law through a combination of text and a "peculiarly federal concern" '249 or a
"'uniquely federal' interest" 5' with which state law would significantly
conflict. But Boyle stopped short of suggesting "uniquely federal interests"
as a universal mode for analyzing federal common law. Nor did it specify
how "peculiar" or "unique" a federal interest must be in order for a court to
establish federal common law. As we have already discussed, 5' federal in-
terests are myriad, and their strength difficult to assess. Why is the federal
interest in injuries on navigable waterways so unique that federal law must
control, while state law is regarded as perfectly adequate for injuries caused
by trucks on interstate highways?252 Why is the congressional interest in
regulating medical devices strong enough to preempt state product-liability
law that has an indirect regulatory effect2 53 but not strong enough to create
an enclave of federal product-liability law for medical devices? As sugges-
tive as the "uniquely federal interests" approach is, it seems a conclusion
rather than a method of analysis.
A distinct difficulty with the "constitutional preemption" form of the
enclave theory is attempting to explain the incorporation of state law as the
federal rule of decision. 54 Practically speaking, borrowing state law as the
federal rule of decision puts the litigants in the same position as using state
law. If the constitutional structure demands courts to make federal law,
then this result seems curious, to say the least. It is probably possible to
construct an analytical path that leads from constitutional preemption of
state law to the voluntary use of that law to define federal obligations, but it
is an inelegant route that should be avoided if a straighter path can be
found.
These difficulties do not mean that the "jurisdictional implication" and
the "constitutional preemption" theories have no explanatory power. Boyle,
for instance, relies on doctrines developed in the context of federal statutory
preemption of state law to justify the creation of a government contractor
248 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-292 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment limits
the scope of state libel law).
249 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,505 (1988).
250 Id.
251 See supra text following note 219.
252 Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P. 2d 1181 (Wash. 1972); cf Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying state law to toxic spill arising in rail yard); Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (applying state law to injury occurring along track of railroad engaged in in-
terstate commerce).
253 See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
254 See supra notes 10-14, 180 and accompanying text.
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defense.255 The relationship among the four classic enclaves of federal
common law and four of the federal courts' jurisdictional grants seems
more than coincidental. Likewise, the idea that federal common law should
be made in areas of "uniquely federal interest," as fuzzy as that phrase is,
has some force.
Therefore, like the abolitionist theory and the theory of broad common
law rulemaking, the enclave theories have some attractive features. Perhaps
the best that can be said for federal common law is that it is a pragmatic
mixture of these features-that no unifying theory of federal common law
exists. In the next section, however, we suggest a different conclusion: a
theory that borrows from each of the theories on offer, yet tethers the field
of federal common law to a single unifying ideal.
IV. A THEORY OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. The Basic Theory
Our theory of federal common law begins with a simple observation:
There is reason to doubt the objectivity of state law and state courts in cer-
tain matters. Problems of objectivity come in two varieties: objectivity in
making law and objectivity in applying law. With respect to making law,
legislative, executive, and judicial lawmakers can rationally be expected to
make laws favoring well-represented political interests; the converse propo-
sition also holds, and lawmakers can be expected not to favor unrepresented
political interests and interests that are systematically underrepresented.256
In other cases, however, the major concern lies not with lawmaking; the
law, as written or announced, is the result of competition among well-
represented interests and is therefore perceived as "fair enough." Rather,
the major concern is that the law will not be applied neutrally toward those
with outsider status.
We do not mean to take sides on the question of whether state lawmak-
ing is in fact biased in either of these two directions. That argument is a
corollary of the "parity" debate that has cloven, without clear victor, the
cases and standard scholarship in the field." 7 For our purposes, it is enough
255 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08. Boyle created federal common law when a "significant conflict" between
state law and "uniquely federal interests" existed. Id. Boyle stated that the conflict, while needing to be sig-
nificant, did not need to be as acute as it would have to be for statutory preemption analysis. Id.
256 Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.").
257 Compare Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 408-09 (1871) (holding that state courts lack the
power to issue writs of habeas corpus to release persons enlisted in armed forces, the Court said, "[tihe ex-
perience of the late rebellion has shown us that, in times of great popular excitement, there may be found in
every State large numbers ready and anxious to embarrass the operations of the government, and easily per-
suaded to believe every step taken for the enforcement of its authority illegal and void"), and Burt Neubome,
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to observe that states might be thought to be biased against unrepresented or
systematically underrepresented interests. Whatever its truth, the idea is
older than our Constitution. The perceived hostility of state courts to credi-
tors of foreign nations and other states was a powerful force in the creation
of a national court system. 5 In The Federalist, Number 80-which deals
with "The Powers of the Judiciary"-Alexander Hamilton undertook to ex-
plain why the Article III grants of jurisdiction were the "proper objects" "of
the federal judicature." '259 In a telling passage, Hamilton explained the ne-
cessity, in a federal system, of establishing federal courts to adjudicate cer-
tain kinds of cases:
The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which the
State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself No man
ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to
which he has the least interest or bias.260
Hamilton understood that a state could discriminate in favor of itself or
its citizens in both the creation and the application of legal standards. Dis-
cussing the ninth grant of subject-matter jurisdiction (in particular, the
power to hear disputes involving land granted by different states), he argued
that in some situations states might be tempted to stack the deck in favor of
themselves or their citizens:
The laws may have... prejudged the question, and tied the courts down to de-
cisions in favor of the grants of the State to which they belonged. And even
where this had not been done, it would be natural that the judges, as men,
261should feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own government.
Writing in the generation following the ratification of the Constitution,
Justice Story also argued that doubts about the ability of states to create and
apply law objectively was a foundational assumption on which the national
court system was based:
[A]dmitting that the judges of the state courts are, and always will be, of as
much learning, integrity, and wisdom, as those of the courts of the United
The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (positing that state courts are in fact inferior to federal
courts along several metrics of measurement), with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976) (hold-
ing that Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review, the Court said, "[d]espite differences
in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity
to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States"). See also id. ("[T]here is no in-
trinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious,
or learned with respect to the consideration of Fourth Amendment claims than his neighbor in the state court-
house." (internal quotations omitted)).
258 Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the
Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421.
259 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 532.
260 Id. at 536.
261 Id.
A Theory of Federal Common Law
States, (which we cheerfully admit,) it does not aid the argument. It is mani-
fest that the constitution has proceeded on a theory of its own .... The consti-
tution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state
attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests might some-
times obstruct, or control, the regular administration of justice.262
Story thought that these questions of state objectivity especially explained
the grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts but that jurisdiction
over federal questions, cases affecting ambassadors, and admiralty ulti-
mately rested on "reasons of a higher and more extensive nature, touching
the safety, peace, and sovereignty of the nation." '263
Generalizing from the concerns of Hamilton and Story, we have at
least some reason to worry about the objectivity of the states in both making
and applying their laws. Assuming that a court wished to redress the per-
ception of bias, the remedies for bias in lawmaking and law application are
different. When a state creates law that systematically favors homespun in-
terests at the expense of those without effective representation, the proper
remedy requires courts either to change the structure of lawmaking institu-
tions or to create a system of legal rights and obligations independent of the
influence of the dominant set of interests. When the question is one of neu-
tral application of law that is on its face "fair enough," the remedy requires
courts either to change the structure of local adjudicatory institutions or to
provide a neutral forum in which local bias is minimized.
In both situations, the first option requires courts to reform the democ-
ratic and adjudicatory institutions of the offending states-a daunting task
that courts usually accept only under the command of the Constitution or a
federal statute.264 As a practical matter, therefore, in most situations courts
that wish to address issues of bias are left with the second set of options:
make new, superseding law to address lawmaking bias, and offer a neutral
forum to counteract bias in the application of law.
The idea of providing a neutral forum to protect against the bias of
state courts in applying state law should ring a familiar bell-it is the most
common reason given to explain the grant of diversity jurisdiction to the
federal courts.265 In this situation, existing interests within the state are
similarly situated to the interests of the outsider, and therefore can be re-
garded as adequate representatives of the interests of the outsiders. In other
words, the law on the books is "fair enough." For instance, the defendant in
a car accident within the state might live in another state, but there are
262 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346-47 (1816).
263 Id. at 347.
264 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (1966) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
265 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 99-110 (1969); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 5.3.2 (discussing arguments on both sides);
Friendly, supra note 18; Kramer, supra note 18, at 102-07, 119-21 (arguing against bias rationale).
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plenty of other drivers living in the state with similar interests. Absent spe-
cial circumstances, there is no reason to worry that the state has made laws
that especially burden the out-of-state drivers. 66 There is a concern, how-
ever, that the state's courts will be hostile to the out-of-state driver when it
comes time to apply its "fair enough" law to the driver. A disinterested fo-
rum can allay this concern.
Federal common law redresses the remaining problem of bias: bias
against interests that are unrepresented or systematically underrepresented
in the creation of state law. Put simply, this reality is the core of our theory
of federal common law: Federal common law can be created only when
there exists a legitimate concern that, if state law were created to deal with
the dispute, state lawmakers likely would discriminate in a systematic and
pervasive way in favor of the state or its citizens, and against outsiders
whose interests are not likely to be protected in the lawmaking process. Al-
though potential bias in the creation of state law is a necessary condition for
federal common law, it is not sufficient. Other "uniquely federal interests,"
such as the presence of the United States or a compelling need for national
uniformity, must also be present. But potential bias in state lawmaking is
the sine qua non that justifies-in fact requires, in the absence of governing
constitutional or statutory authority-federal common lawmaking.
Under this theory, federal common law addresses bias in state lawmak-
ing, and a federal forum addresses bias in the application of state law.
Thus, the theory explains one of the apparent paradoxes of federal common
law. The reason that federal common law can arise under some of Article
III's jurisdictional grants, but not generally under the diversity grants, is
that the diversity grants are designed to deal with potential bias in the appli-
cation, rather than the creation, of state law-a problem for which a neutral
federal forum, rather than federal common law, is the solution.267
B. Applying the Theory to the Enclaves of Federal Common Law
The present enclaves of federal common law fit within this account of
federal common law.
1. United States as a Party.-The argument for federal common law
in this situation is self-evident. It is not difficult to imagine how states
could stack the deck in favor of themselves or their citizens in cases involv-
ing the rights and liabilities of federal government. The states could evis-
266 This does not mean that all drivers within the state regard the driving laws as "fair" in the sense that
the laws impose only reasonable obligations on them. The state may be under the influence of the pedestrian
lobby and have laws that are, from a driver's perspective, quite "unfair." Our point is only that there are no
particular or peculiar laws that unduly burden the behavior of out-of-state drivers. Therefore, the law is "fair
enough."
267 Certain defenses, such as the government contractor defense or claim preclusion, present differ-
ent considerations that can justify the creation of limited forms of federal common law in cases jurisdic-
tionally grounded on the diversity grants. See infra notes 284-286, 308--327 and accompanying text.
A Theory of Federal Common Law
cerate or encumber activities and programs of the federal government with
which they disagreed. Although federal legislation would preempt such ef-
forts by recalcitrant state governments,268 no legislation could specify in
minute detail all the rights and obligations of federal activities in their inter-
section with state law.269 In the absence of a federal statute, it seems natural
that federal common law-and not state law-should control.27 °
That controversies in which the federal government is a party could not
be left to the states to decide was so obvious to Hamilton that he spent only
two sentences on the issue in The Federalist. As he said, "Controversies
between the nation and its members or citizens, can only be properly re-
ferred to the national tribunals. Any other plan would be contrary to reason,
to precedent, and to decorum."27' Although the question of forum and the
question of source of law are distinct, Hamilton's fears speak equally to the
need for a federal rule of decision.
As we have seen, federal common law extends beyond cases in which
the rights and obligations of the United States are at stake.272 This result is
explicable under the same rationale. Whether the United States is formally
a party or not, a state might be tempted to discriminate in favor of itself or
its citizens when the discriminatory effect will ultimately be felt by the fed-
eral government.273
2. Disputes Between States.-Perhaps even less needs to be said
about why, in the absence of a governing constitutional or statutory source,
federal common law should apply to controversies between two states. 27 4 In
such disputes, states would be tempted to stack the deck to favor them-
selves. As Hamilton observed in The Federalist,
268 The Supremacy Clause would give federal legislation precedence over contrary state law. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
269 Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("A constitution, to contain an accu-
rate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they
may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced
by the human mind. It would, probably, never be understood by the public.").
270 For one statutory scheme dictating the use of state rather than federal law to determine the liability of
the United States, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2000). These provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act
prove our point: They make the United States liable only to the extent that "a private individual under like
circumstances" would be. Congress excluded tort obligations that a state would be tempted to impose spe-
cifically on the government. Cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955) (noting that
the "private individual" language avoids "covertly embedding the casuistries of municipal liability for torts").
271 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 533.
272 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
273 For a variant of this reasoning, see Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1988).
274 This reasoning holds equally in cases where the litigants are private parties but the underlying issues
turn on interstate disputes: if the dispute is formally between two states, the states will be tempted to dis-
criminate in favor of themselves; if formally between private citizens, the states will be tempted to discrimi-
nate in favor of their citizens.
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[a] method of terminating territorial disputes between the States, under the au-
thority of the federal head, was not unattended to, even in the imperfect system
by which they have been hitherto held together. But there are many other
sources, besides interfering claims of boundary, from which bickerings and
animosities may spring up among the members of the Union. To some of
these we have been witness in the course of our past experience. It will readily
be conjectured that I allude to the fraudulent laws which have been passed in
too many of the States. And though the proposed Constitution establishes par-
ticular guards against the repetition of those instances which have heretofore
made their appearance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend that the spirit which
produced them will assume new shapes, that could not be foreseen nor specifi-
cally provided against. Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the
harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal superintendence and
control.275
Moreover, this reasoning is equally applicable to the eighth Article III
grant, involving citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different states. In such cases, no less than in cases of border disputes be-
tween states themselves, states would be tempted to pass laws favoring their
own grants. 176
3. International Relations.-Likewise, states might well be tempted
unfairly to give advantage to themselves or their citizens in cases involving
foreign relations. Zschernig v. Miller277 provides a perfect example. The
Oregon law in issue there, which the Supreme Court struck down, purported
to deprive foreigners of inheritances unless their home countries granted re-
ciprocal rights for United States citizens. This statute served to deprive for-
eigners, but not citizens of Oregon, of their otherwise lawful inheritances.
Foreign citizens, of course, have virtually no power or representation within
Oregon's lawmaking process. If state law were allowed to govern such is-
sues, the possibilities for additional discrimination against unrepresented
foreigners to the advantage of a state or its citizens would be numerous. As
Hamilton observed in The Federalist:
[T]he peace of the WHOLE [United States] ought not to be left at the disposal
of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for
the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to
be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.
278
Thus, courts must apply federal common law in the area of foreign rela-
tions.
275 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 535.
276 Cf Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (finding, in a suit be-
tween two Colorado parties over water rights in a river that divided Colorado from New Mexico, that federal
common law applies), discussed supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
277 389 U.S. 429 (1968), discussed supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
278 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 533-34.
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4. Admiralty (Prize Cases).-With regard to admiralty, at least some
federal common lawmaking power is required. Prize cases must be gov-
erned by federal law, lest states be tempted to stack the deck in favor of the
interests of their own citizens, whether they be seafaring or not. Because
prize cases arise in time of war, and the prizes seized are likely to belong to
foreign nationals, prize cases must be seen as an aspect of the nation's ef-
forts to conduct its foreign policy. The need for a uniform national law fol-
lows, just as it does in other matters of international affairs. As The
Federalist points out in the context of arguing for federal jurisdiction over
these cases, even
[t]he most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a dispo-
sition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances of maritime causes.
These so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the
rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative
to the public peace." 9
5. The Hard Cases: Government Contractor Defense, Admiralty (In-
stance Cases), and Preclusion in Diversity Cases.-Federal com-
mon law also exists in three other pockets: the government contractor
defense (a "uniquely federal interest" posing a "significant conflict" with
state law), instance cases in admiralty, and federal rules of preclusion for
diversity cases. These situations do not obviously involve discrimination
against unrepresented or underrepresented interests, and therefore require
more detailed explanation.
a. Government contractor defense.-We begin with the easiest
of the three. Government contractors, which operate in many states and in-
clude some of the wealthiest American corporations, would not readily fit
the description of unrepresented or underrepresented interests. During the
1980s, in the run-up to Boyle, contractors had lobbied legislatures and im-
portuned courts around the country to create a government contract de-
fense. 8° Although their efforts met with mixed success, we cannot in
honesty say that they lacked political clout. Under our theory, federal
common law cannot be made merely because a participant in state lawmak-
ing loses a political fight; the participant must be an outsider, a person or
institution systematically unrepresented or underrepresented in the state
lawmaking process.
As the Court's five-to-four division reflects, the issue is close. But we
believe that Boyle represents a legitimate application of the theory. The key
to the common law power lies in Boyle's observation that the party ulti-
279 Id at 536.
280 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (detailing
failed congressional efforts to create a contractor defense through legislation); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (recognizing a government contractor defense).
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mately affected by the government contractor defense is the United States
itself' If no such defense existed, rational contractors would charge an
additional amount to cover the cost of anticipated injuries or the cost of in-
suring against those injuries. The federal government would therefore ulti-
mately bear the cost of injuries, and states would often have little incentive
to create law immunizing the federal government at the expense of their
own citizens. Even if some states did so,282 others would not, and savvy at-
torneys could in many cases obtain the benefit of those states' law through
manipulation of forum selection and choice of law rules.
Note that Boyle's federal common lawmaking authority ends precisely
where the government's unrepresented interests end. Boyle did not create a
general federal law of products liability for government contractors; there
was no need of that because contractors are capable of participating in
states' political processes to shape tort law. Rather the structure of Boyle's
contractor defense-which requires that the government create or approve
reasonably precise specifications and that the contractors comply with those
specifications23-means that it is the government's decisionmaking, and
only the government's decisionmaking, that the defense protects. Just as
federal common law protects the interests of the United States when it is a
party,284 so the contractor defense protects the United States when the gov-
ernment is not a party.285 That fact rescues Boyle from one of the conun-
drums over which the enclave theory stumbles: how to explain the creation
of a federal common law defense in a case decided under the diversity
grant.286
b. Admiralty (instance cases).-Instance cases in admiralty raise
thornier issues of explanation. In instance cases, it is tempting to say that
the courts have not created common law at all-at least as we have defined
the term. Under our definition, federal common law excludes common law
made under a congressional grant of authority. 287 Arguably federal common
law in instance cases derives from the jurisdictional grant of § 1 333.288 The
281 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507, 511-12.
282 Of course, some states might have created a government contractor defense either to shield their own
state or local governments, or to advance the interests of well-represented contractors. For one pre-Boyle rec-
ognition of the defense at the state level, see Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 381 A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977).
283 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
284 See supra notes 268-273 and accompanying text.
285 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (arguing that "the interests of the United States will be directly affected"
by holding contractors accountable (emphasis added)).
286 See supra notes 233-236, 247-255 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
288 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) provides in relevant part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion, exclusive of the courts of the States, of ... [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." For a brief discus-
sion of the "saving to suitors" clause, see supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
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"saving to suitors" clause provides an option to those injured in instance
cases to bring, in some situations, state law claims. That language implies,
rather strongly, that some law other than state law also might apply to
"suitors." But Congress has never legislated rules of decision to govern in-
stance cases. Therefore, once we accept the (debatable) claim that instance
cases lie within the cognizance of admiralty law,289 we are led to the conclu-
sion that Congress has implicitly authorized federal courts to create a fed-
eral common law of instance cases. Because this is not the type of federal
common law with which this Article is concerned, however, it can be ex-
cluded from further discussion.
Prudence cautions us to stop there,29° but we think that our theory actu-
ally has something to say about instance cases. Admiralty has long been
seen as a distinctive body of law, separate from both common law and eq-
uity.29' It is difficult today to understand exactly how distinctive and unique
admiralty was. During the Middle Ages, England, like most European
countries of the time, established a special set of courts to deal with admi-
ralty matters-a fact demonstrating the unique place that oceangoing com-
merce occupied in English and international life.292 A separate system of
admiralty courts was carried over to the American colonies. 93 Even during
the ascendancy of the Articles of Confederation, when no national judiciary
existed, national courts of admiralty were convened on an ad hoc basis.294
At the Constitutional Convention, there was no question that admiralty was
a national interest, or that the national courts created by Article III would
encompass admiralty cases. The New England states derived substantial
revenue from sailing interests, and the Southern states depended largely on
the ships of foreign countries to carry their raw materials across the seas,
and their slaves back.295 Even more generally, shipping by water was the
lifeblood of the young country; roads were poor, and railroads lay decades
289 On the debatable nature of this form of admiralty law, see supra notes 133-145 and accompanying
text.
290 Others who have assayed theories of federal common law have used a similar technique and justified
exclusion of some of the common law categories as simply not being true instances of federal common law.
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 16, at 1026-30. Because the Court says that it is applying federal common law,
however, we think that a theory has at least some burden of explanation.
291 STEPHEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY §§ 2-15,21-36,41-51 (7th ed. 2005).
292 Id. §§ 21-22. For Justice Story's history on the law of English admiralty, told in an effort to con-
vince the reader of admiralty's unique position in the new American government, see De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F.
Cas. 418, 426 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776), discussed supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
293 FRIEDELL, supra note 291, § 61.
294 FALLON ET AL., supra note 22, at 6-7 & n.33.
295 See Thomas P. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Unifonnity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91
VA. L. REv. 249, 327-28 & n.279 (2005); see also Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 8 (1870) (re-
porting counsel's argument that the colony of Massachusetts Bay, which encompassed Massachusetts,
Maine, and Nova Scotia, "was, before the Revolution, probably more largely engaged in commerce than any
other, and the records of the Courts of Admiralty held in it would be likely to contain more maritime deci-
sions than would be found elsewhere").
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in the future. Therefore, the only issue was how far such admiralty jurisdic-
tion would extend.296
Moreover, the law of admiralty, which had descended from Roman
law, was different than the law that the states applied in analogous common
law litigation, and was frankly in significant friction with the common
law. 2 97 "Its system of procedure has been established for ages, and is essen-
tially founded ... on the civil law; and this is probably one reason why so
much hostility was exhibited against the admiralty by the courts of common
law ... 29
In this environment, it is easy to understand the fear that outsider inter-
ests-whether they be the interests of a Southerner in a New England court
or a New Englander or a foreigner in a Southern court-would receive in-
sufficient attention under a state's common law.2 99 Indeed, that concern
makes instance cases in admiralty law appear simply to be a specific appli-
cation of the reasons that federal common law has been thought necessary
in interstate and international disputes-to reduce the friction arising from
biased state lawmaking. And that is precisely the understanding with which
the Supreme Court operated as it expanded admiralty jurisdiction in the
nineteenth century. In The Genesee Chief, Chief Justice Taney extended
admiralty jurisdiction to navigation on inland lakes (the Great Lakes, under
the facts of the case). He observed:
Different States border on [the Great Lakes] on one side, and a foreign nation
on the other. A great and growing commerce is carried on upon them between
different States and a foreign nation ....
The union is formed upon the basis of equal rights among all the states.
Courts of admiralty have been found necessary in all commercial countries,
296 See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
297 See William Tetley, Good Faith in Contract: Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Char-
tering, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 561, 610 (2004) ("The English admiralty courts, where all the lawyers and
judges were civilian and trained in the Roman law tradition, applied civil law and procedure. The English
common law courts, however, were determined to restrict the admiralty court's jurisdiction .... (footnotes
omitted)). In many regards, the law of admiralty was centuries ahead of its time, and it anticipated changes in
the common law that would not come into full effect until the twentieth century. For instance, the concept of
seaworthiness and libel anticipated the doctrine of negligence. Compare The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) (suit for negligent management of a ship), with Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6
Cush.) 292 (1850) (adopting the idea of negligence, but still using the analytical categories of the writ sys-
tem). Contracts of insurance were enforced in admiralty by 1601; such a contract was at that time "unknown
to the common law; and the common law remedies, when applied to it, were... inadequate and clumsy."
Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 31. The idea of general average contribution, which was well established by
the seventeenth century, anticipated both the twentieth-century doctrine of necessity and, more generally, an
economic approach to questions of injury. Likewise, admiralty had developed rules of contribution centuries
before the common law had. See RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALs ON TORTS 52, 369-70 (7th
ed. 2000).
298 Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 23.
299 See Holt, supra note 258, at 1427-29.
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... for the safety and convenience of commerce, and the speedy decision of
controversies, where delay would often be ruin ....
... [E]xperience in England has proved that a wider range of jurisdiction
was necessary for the benefit of commerce and navigation; and that they
needed courts acting more promptly than courts of common law, and not en-
tangled with the niceties and strictness of common-law pleadings and proceed-
ings.3°°
Admitting that federal common law might have been necessary in
some instance cases, however, is different than saying it should be available
in all. Bias against unrepresented or underrepresented outsiders would not
be present in every instance case; in The Genesee Chief, for instance, both
the libellants and the respondents were citizens of New York.3"' Instance
jurisdiction surely casts too broad a net, but like many rules that overreach
their purposes, breadth was needed to ensure that the right cases were swept
up.
A slightly different objection to the use of federal common law is to
leapfrog to modem times. Today the doctrines of admiralty law are not re-
markably different from those of the common law, in either contract or
tort. 02 The procedural rules used in admiralty cases have nearly collapsed
into the rules used in other federal litigation.3"3 The regionalism of the early
republic has evaporated, at least insofar as we worry about bias for or
against the maritime industry. Large shipping interests would not appear to
have any limitations on participating in the lawmaking process of states; to
the extent they do, similar business interests seem to be able to represent
their concerns vicariously and well.
Some arguments to justify the continued use of federal common law in
instance cases exist. In 2001, 53.9% of all waterbome cargo shipped into,
around, or from the United States was carried in a ship flying under a for-
eign flag, an increase of 11.1% since 1983." A great number of the sea-
men aboard those ships, whether flying under an American or a foreign
300 Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 453-54, 459; see also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558,
575 (1875) (explaining that state law in admiralty "would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at
which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states
with each other or with foreign states").
301 Genesee Chief 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 444.
302 For some comparisons, see supra note 297.
303 In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged the procedures used in former common law
and equity cases, see FED. R. Civ. P. 2, but a separate set of Admiralty Rules still existed. In 1966, the Fed-
eral Rules finally united admiralty and other civil cases, see FED. R. Civ. P., SUPP. R. FOR CERTAIN
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS advisory committee's notes (1966), although a separate set of Supple-
mental Rules is still used to handle some unique features of admiralty practice, see FED. R. Clv. P., SuPP. R.
FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS.
304 U.S. Maritime Admin., US. Waterborne Commerce, MARAD.DOT.GOV, April 7, 2005,
http://www.marad.dot.gov/MARAD_statistics/WBC_1983_2003.pdf.
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flag, are foreign citizens." 5 Therefore, concerns about biased state law
might not have entirely abated.
Nonetheless, we will not make the claim that the maritime industry
would collapse without the use of federal common law in instance cases, or
that the need for uniformity in the maritime industry is significantly more
acute or unique than the need for uniformity in other large commercial sec-
tors, such as manufacturing or transportation. Absent a showing that sail-
ors, ships, shippers, insurers, or others involved with the maritime industry
cannot today protect themselves in the rough and tumble of state lawmak-
ing-a showing that we are not prepared to make-we also submit that it
would be appropriate to apply state law to instance cases. Federal common
law in instance cases may be an historical curiosity, a dinosaur that has out-
lived the reasons for its existence. Legal rules are often like that, and our
theory suggests that instance cases could today leave the federal common
law fold. 6 Of course, the "saving to suitors" clause may get in the way of
any move toward the adoption of state law, and courts may feel compelled
to create and apply federal common law under its terms. If they do, that
simply confirms what we have also suggested-that federal common law in
instance cases is legislatively directed, and therefore not the type of free-
standing common law that we are discussing in this Article.30 7
c. Preclusion in diversity cases.-That leaves Semtek, by far the
hardest case to explain. As with instance cases, an argument can be made
that Semtek does not involve the free-standing federal common law to
which our theory applies. Semtek appears to create federal common law of
a most extraordinary kind-the Swift v. Tyson type of common law suppos-
edly abolished by Erie. Semtek creates a federal rule of preclusive effect
that operates only on judgments entered in federal court; the case nowhere
suggests that federal common law determines the preclusive effect of a state
law judgment entered in state court, It is tempting to dismiss Semtek be-
cause it is not the classic form of federal common law our theory addresses.
But it is not so simple. As the facts of Semtek reveal, an enforcing
state court is also required to use and implement the federal common law
rule of the rendering federal court. Therefore, Semtek does in fact create a
rule of law enforceable in both federal and state courts, and does not return
federal courts to the world of Swift v. Tyson.
As with the government contractor and instance cases, we believe that
our theory justifies Semtek. On its face, this claim seems extraordinary.
We know of no evidence suggesting that, when Semtek was decided in
305 William R. Hawkins, Losing Command of the Sea (Part I), AMERICANECONOMICALERT.ORG, Dec.
3, 2002, http://tmdealert.us/view-art.asp?ProdID=704.
306 An interim step would be to make a move that the Court has made in other cases: to incorporate state
law as the federal rule of decision. See supra notes 10-14, 180 and accompanying text; infra notes 332-346
and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 287-289 and accompanying text.
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2001, state courts were establishing rules on the preclusive effects of judg-
ments in a manner that disadvantaged outsiders or favored insiders. Cali-
fornia's rule denying preclusive effect to a judgment dismissing a case on
statute-of-limitations grounds could as easily benefit an outsider as an in-
sider; moreover, California insiders with reason to argue for greater preclu-
sive effect would have adequately represented the interests of similarly
situated outsiders. The same can be said of the rules applied in Maryland
courts. Therefore, our theory may appear to suggest that Semtek was
wrongly decided.
Perhaps, but we strongly believe that Semiek was correctly decided,
and that it further demonstrates the validity of our theory. The proof of this
claim, however, is lengthy and intricate. Step away for a minute from the
particular question of the preclusive effect of a diversity judgment. Begin
by assuming that the Constitution includes no Full Faith and Credit
Clause,"°8 and Congress has passed no full faith and credit statute.30 9 As-
sume as well the following facts, suggested by the facts of Semtek: Smith, a
citizen of California, sues Jones, a citizen of Maryland, in a state court in
California on a state law claim. Jones obtains a favorable judgment on the
statute of limitations. California courts do not regard a dismissal on statute-
of-limitations grounds as a judgment on the merits and would accord this
judgment no preclusive effect. Smith now re-files the case in Maryland,
which has a longer statute of limitations but which also regards dismissals
on statute-of-limitations grounds as dismissals on the merits. Jones wants
to argue that the California judgment precludes the second suit, using Mary-
land's law of preclusion.
According to our theory, these facts require the application of federal
common law-albeit not in precisely the way that it might seem. Although
Jones is an outsider in California, and he has had no opportunity to partici-
pate in the framing of California's unfavorable (to him) law of preclusion,
these facts alone do not give license to create federal common law. Jones
was virtually represented by "insider" Californians who had the same inter-
est in achieving broad preclusive effects for California judgments. Under
our theory, Jones has no right to expect federal common law to determine
the preclusive effect of a statute-of-limitations dismissal; California is free
to decide that question on its own.
When Smith re-files in Maryland, however, a problem of adequate rep-
resentation arises. Smith needs California's law of preclusive effect for
statute-of-limitation dismissals to carry over to Maryland in order for her
case to succeed against Jones. Maryland courts, however, have little incen-
tive to apply another state's law on preclusion. It is the California courts'
interests in having their judgments enforced according to California law
308 Which it does: U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
309 Which it has: 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The statute, first passed in somewhat different form in 1790,
is sometimes called the Federal Res Judicata Act. 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 165, § 4467.
639
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that finds no representation in Maryland. The fact that Smith is a citizen of
California-and therefore an outsider in Maryland-certainly does not help
the situation, but the real difficulty is that there exist no checks on the self-
dealing tendency of Maryland's courts to choose their own law of preclu-
sion to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment obtained in another
state--either in all cases, or in cases in which they can create advantages for
their own citizens. The problem is akin to the problem that is presented in
interstate disputes; each state has an incentive to choose its own law.31°
The point was obvious enough that even the Articles of Confederation
contained a full faith and credit clause that required only modest strengthen-
ing in the Constitution."' James Madison recognized as much; he devoted
only a bit of time to justifying the Full Faith and Credit Clause:
The power of prescribing by general laws, the manner in which . . .judicial
proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in
other States, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to
this subject in the articles of Confederation .... The power here established
may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly
beneficial on the borders of contiguous States .... "'
In the absence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute, concerns for
self-regarding behavior and interstate friction create, under our theory, a
classic case for the use of federal common law to determine the preclusive
effect of a judgment rendered in another state.
Still assuming the absence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and stat-
ute, the next question is the exact content of the federal common law rule.
At least four rules are possible: (1) according the judgment the preclusive
effect it would have had under the law of the state in which the judgment
was obtained (on our facts, California); (2) according the judgment the pre-
clusive effect it would have under the state in which enforcement occurs (on
our facts, Maryland); (3) on the particular facts of statute-of-limitations
dismissals, requiring the enforcing state (Maryland) to apply the statute of
limitations of the rendering state (California); or (4) developing a federal
body of rules on the preclusive effect of judgments (e.g., "Dismissals on
statute-of-limitations grounds bar subsequent litigation on the same
310 See supra notes 274-276 and accompanying text.
311 Article IV of the Articles of Confederation stated in relevant part: "Full faith and credit shall be
given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates
of every other State." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of Arti-
cle IV of the Constitution strengthened this clause by, inter alia, authorizing Congress to enact legisla-
tion prescribing the manner for proving the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings subject to full
faith and credit and prescribing the effect that these acts, records, and proceedings would have.
312 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 18, at 285-86. Madison's quoted comments
related only to the Constitution's strengthening of the Articles of Confederation's full faith and credit clause,
discussed supra note 311. He did not think it necessary to explain the reason for the basic idea of full faith
and credit.
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claim."313), and then requiring all enforcing state courts to follow this uni-
form rule.
Of the four possibilities, the second-mutual disrespect for other
states' judgments-must be rejected out of hand, for it does not solve the
problem of interstate friction that gave rise to the need for federal common
law in the first instance. The fourth possibility also seems undesirable. As-
sume that the chosen federal rule of preclusive effect was the same as that
of Maryland. If the second lawsuit was filed in a California state court,
then California would presumably still be free to apply its own rule of pre-
clusive effect. If the second case were filed in any other state court, how-
ever, the Maryland-like rule would apply. It is again hard to see how this
approach avoids the friction that animates, at least in part, the need for fed-
eral common law. The inequity and inducement to shop for forums-the
policy concerns that also underpin Erie-are patent. Therefore, only the
first and the third possibilities remain as realistic options.
Because of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the implementing full
faith and credit statute, we need no federal common law to deal with this
situation. The Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute generally require
that every state court accord the California judgment the same effect it
would have in California-the first of the four possibilities described above.
There is a nice question about whether, in the particular context of a statute-
of-limitations dismissal, the Clause and statute require the third rule, so that
the second state (Maryland) must use the statute of limitations from the first
state (California) when the case is re-filed in the second state. The answer
is uncertain," 4 and the "no" answer implicitly given by the Maryland courts
set up the Semtek problem."5 Concerns for equity and elimination of forum
shopping suggest that the answer probably should be "yes," thus obviating
the Semtek problem when the first case is filed in state court. Ultimately,
however, the answer must be derived from an interpretation of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and statute; it is not a question for which federal
common law provides a direct answer. The critical points to grasp are, first,
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute supplant a field that would
otherwise be governed by federal common law, and second, that the sub-
313 Of course, the uniform federal rule could also be the opposite: "Dismissals on statute-of-limitations
grounds do not bar subsequent litigation on the same claim." The difference between this option and the first
three is that this option specifies the content of the preclusion ride; the first three refer to the extant law of the
rendering or enforcing forum.
314 For a discussion of the uncertainty of whether Maryland must give a California dismissal on statute-
of-limitations grounds the same preclusive effect as a California court would, see SHAPIRO, supra note 36, at
126-27 & n. 11.
315 In Semtek, of course, the California court was a federal court, not a state court as in our hypothetical.
Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001). The "Semtek problem," however, is one of
deciding how much of the California judgment "carried forward." If the Maryland court had been required to
carry forward the California statute of limitations, then it would have dismissed the case. It is only because
the California statute of limitations did not travel with the California judgment that the second-level question
of the preclusive effect of the California judgment-the "Semtek problem"-came into play.
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stance of the constitutional and statutory rules is consonant with our theory
of federal common law.
Matters are otherwise once federal courts enter the picture. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause neither applies to federal courts nor compels an en-
forcing state or federal court to give any preclusive effect to a judgment
rendered in federal court.316 The full faith and credit statute requires enforc-
ing state (or federal) courts to give full faith and credit to the judgments of
the rendering federal court,317 but the statute does not determine either the
source (state or federal law) or the substance of the rendering federal court's
preclusion law. The Supremacy Clause requires state (but not federal)
courts to accept federal law as the "supreme Law of the Land," '318 and some
courts and commentators have suggested that state courts' obligation to en-
force a federal judgment can be derived from this clause in conjunction with
either the Article I's "necessary and proper" clause or Article III itself.319
But that approach fails to answer the critical questions: What are the source
and substance of the "law" that state courts must respect?30
The answers lie in the federal common law that remains after the "ren-
dering state court, enforcing state court" piece has been supplanted by the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute. In the "rendering federal court,
enforcing state court" scenario, the need for federal common law is at least
as compelling as in the "rendering state court, enforcing state court" sce-
nario. Similar concerns exist about the enforcing state court's self-
regarding behavior in the face of the unrepresented interests of the render-
ing federal court. So do concerns for destructive friction. Indeed, in the
context of a federal diversity judgment, the friction is multiplied; not only
would there be interstate friction when one state court refuses to enforce a
judgment based on the law of another state, but there would also be the in-
tersystem friction when a state court enforced a federal judgment according
to the state court's own terms.32' Therefore, a federal common law of pre-
clusion must be adopted to avoid the self-regarding behavior of enforcing
state courts.
If the source of the rule is federal common law, the next question is the
substance of the federal rule. The four choices that we suggested above still
seem to apply, albeit with some modification. 22 The choices are as follows:
316 See, e.g., Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S.
461 (1982).
317 See 18B WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 165, §§ 4468, 4469.
318 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
319 See, e.g., Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9 (1883); 18B WRiGHTErAL., supra note 165, § 4468.
320 See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507 ("And no ... federal textual provision, neither of the Constitution nor of
any statute, addresses the claim-preclusive effect of a judgment in a federal diversity action.").
321 Cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816) (rejecting the idea that the United
States Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals on federal questions taken from a state supreme
court).
322 See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
A Theory of Federal Common Law
(1) according the judgment the effect it would have had under the preclu-
sion law of the state in which the federal court renders the judgment (on our
facts, California); (2) according the judgment the preclusive effect it would
have under the state in which enforcement occurs (on our facts, Maryland);
(3) requiring the enforcing state (Maryland) to apply the statute of limita-
tions applied by the rendering federal court (on our facts, California's stat-
ute of limitation); or (4) developing a body of federal rules on the
preclusive effect of federal courts' judgments. Once again, the second op-
tion is not desirable; allowing an enforcing state court to choose its own law
to determine the preclusive effect of a federal judgment does nothing to as-
suage the concerns that animate the creation of federal common law. The
fourth choice-creating a body of federal common law rules of preclu-
sion-makes more sense in the context of a rendering federal court than in
the context of a rendering state court. Nonetheless, symmetry, as well as
Erie-esque concerns for the equitable administration of the laws and the
prevention of forum shopping,323 suggest that a wiser choice would be to
adopt the same rules on preclusive effect as the state court-at least for a
claim based on state law.324 No a priori argument can determine the choice
between the first and third options. As long as we construe the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and statute to choose the first option, however, symmetry
and Erie-esque concerns suggest that the first option is preferable.
The "rendering federal court, enforcing federal court" scenario in-
volves less friction and, due to the unitary nature of the federal courts, per-
haps less concern for self-regarding behavior. But little is gained by
allowing an enforcing federal court to give whatever preclusive effect it de-
sires to the rendering federal court's judgment. Indeed, in the context of
state law claims, the potential for intersystem friction remains, with the
state court, rather than the federal court, now in the position of the unrepre-
sented interest.3 5 Again, federal common law provides the source for de-
termining the preclusive effect of a federal judgment.326
323 See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09 (discussing Erie-related concerns inherent in choosing a rule on the
preclusive effect of a diversity judgment).
324 A claim based on federal law presents other issues. The use of federal common law to determine the
preclusive effect of a federal judgment deciding a federal question is beyond cavil. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S.
165 (1938); see Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507. What the substance of that common law rule should be is a separate
issue. Ultimately, our theory is designed to determine whether federal common law should apply, not to de-
termine the substance of that law.
325 An interesting, and surprising, consequence of our account of federal common law is that there are
extra reasons for a federal court to apply federal common law in the context of a diversity case. The need to
avoid intersystem friction does not pertain to a federal question case in which the enforcement of a federal
court's judgment is left to another federal court, but the need does arise when the federal judgment is based
on state law. Therefore, federal common law must apply in the context of the enforcement of a federal
court's diversity judgments.
326 To complete the picture, in the "rendering state court, enforcing federal court" context, the full faith
and credit statute requires enforcing federal courts to give the same effect to a state court's judgment that the
rendering state court would give. When the state court renders a judgment on a federal question, however,
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Therefore, the federal common law that operates in federal courts after
Semtek is not the forbidden Swift v. Tyson sort of federal common law.
Rather, this common law would apply equally to state and federal courts but
for the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute. The
Clause and statute displace common law in the context of the "rendering
state court, enforcing state court" situation, but leave common law undis-
turbed in other scenarios. Like all federal common law, this common law is
subject to displacement, should Congress ever enact constitutionally appro-
priate legislation requiring a particular preclusive effect."' The problem
with which federal common law is concerned is bias in the creation of state
law. When Congress creates uniform federal rules, a necessary condition
for creating federal common law is lacking.
C. Bias in the Creation of State Law: A Necessary but Insufficient
Condition
Our theory is immediately subject to an important criticism. At vari-
ous times, and with unfortunate frequency, states have demonstrated indif-
ference to the plight of systemically underrepresented groups (for instance,
enacting laws against miscegenation328 or integrated school systems,329 or re-
fusing to strike down racially restrictive covenants33 ). Despite the dis-
criminatory potential of state law, courts have never created a federal
common law of marriage, education, housing, or, more generally, race or
gender relations.33' These areas seem far more significant places to estab-
the Supreme Court has never decided whether state law or federal common law is the source of the rule de-
termining the preclusive effect of the state judgment. See SHAPIRO, supra note 36, at 135-44; 18B WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 165, § 4469. Notions of symmetry point toward the use of federal common law, as would
Erie-esque considerations of equity and prevention of forum shopping.
327 See Semntek, 531 U.S. at 506-07 (suggesting congressional role in creating a federal statute on preclu-
sive effect). Congress has arguably done so in the past. See Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196
(1873), popularly known as the Conformity Act of 1872. The Act was interpreted in Dupasseur v.
Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1875), to require that a federal court apply state law to determine the pre-
clusive effect of a federal diversityjudgment. See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
328 Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional Virginia's antimiscegenation
statute).
329 Cf Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional de jure segregation in four
states).
330 Cf, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding racially restrictive covenants unconstitutional);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (invalidating judgment seeking to bind inadequately represented Afri-
can American class members to prior judgment upholding a restrictive covenant).
331 A possible exception to this last statement in federal Native American law. The Supreme Court has
never stated that the source of the law applicable to Native American tribes is federal common law; but, to the
extent that no treaty or statute directly controls an outcome, Native American law feels like federal common
law. In logic strikingly similar to that which we have advanced, the Court has stated:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United
States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weak-
ness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with
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lish federal law than most of the areas in which federal common law has
been established. Why, then, has federal common law arisen in-and so
far, only in-these discrete pockets?
This criticism allows us to make an important point about the limited
nature of our theory. The criticism would be most telling if our theory pur-
ported to be a comprehensive account of when courts should create federal
common law-if we claimed, in other words, that courts must create federal
common law whenever state law has or might advantage well-represented
in-state interests. But that is not our claim. To be clear, potential bias in
the creation of state law may be a necessary condition, but it is not a suffi-
cient condition for creating federal common law.
Once potential bias exists, other reasons must then be found to create
federal common law. We believe that Professor Field's work provides an
excellent description of the factors that, at least so far, have moved courts to
create federal common law. The need for uniformity and the potentially
negative effect of state law on the interests of the United States have under-
standably emerged as dominant reasons, but other reasons, such as the ca-
pacity of courts to make law in light of separation of powers and federalism
concerns, are also relevant.
In the examples of marriage, education, and housing, we do not need
federal common law as long as the fundamental law of the state is nondis-
criminatory. For instance, the basic rules for marriage (licensing require-
ments, fees, etc.) do not discriminate against unrepresented or
systematically underrepresented interests. But a discriminatory coda on the
basic requirements (e.g., "Racially mixed couples cannot enjoy the benefits
of marriage") also exists. Once the Equal Protection Clause strikes the
coda, only the nondiscriminatory requirements for marriage remain. As a
result, a federal common law of marriage becomes unnecessary-regardless
of how much we might think that uniform federal standards for marriage
would be desirable. In fact, the Equal Protection Clause removes many in-
stances of state law discrimination against unrepresented or underrepre-
sented interests, and thus limits the circumstances in which federal common
law is a necessary remedy for state law bias. Nor does federal common law
come into play unless other conditions-such as a compelling need for uni-
formity or the presence of the United States as a party-also exist.
The theory is nearly complete. As we have seen, courts sometimes in-
corporate state law as the federal common law rule.332 In order for our the-
them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it
the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive, and by Congress, and by this court,
whenever the question has arisen.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886). On the general question of the sources of fed-
eral power to regulate Native Americans, see MONROE E. PRICE & ROBERT N. CLINTON, LAW AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 122-37 (2d ed. 1983). We are indebted to Joseph Singer for this insight.
332 See supra notes 10-14, 180 and accompanying text.
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ory to be successful, we must finally account for the circumstances in which
courts can incorporate state law as the federal common law rule of decision.
D. Explaining the Incorporation of State Law as the Federal Common Law
Rule
Once a court has decided that (1) states would be tempted to favor
through their laws either themselves or their own citizens and (2) other
compelling reasons (such as uniformity) exist, it should choose federal
common law. The question remains, though, what the substance of the fed-
eral common law rule should be. To answer that question, we must ask and
answer another: Can federal courts create federal common law rules with-
out reference to the state law that the federal common law is displacing, or
should they instead incorporate the state law into the federal rule?
One point is obvious: If federal common law always adopted state law
as its substance, then federal common law would not vindicate the reasons
for its existence. But that fact merely proves that federal law should not
always adopt state law, not that federal law can never adopt state law.
The Supreme Court recognized as much in Boyle. After deciding that
the case involved "uniquely federal interests," and that federal common law
should therefore apply, it went on to discuss whether federal common law
should displace state law.333 Noting that its inquiry in determining whether
federal common law would displace state law did not end with the determi-
nation that the case involved "uniquely federal interests," the Court ex-
plained that such a determination "merely establishes a necessary, not a
sufficient, condition for the displacement of state law." '334 Displacement
will only occur where "a 'significant conflict' exists between an identifiable
'federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law.""'3 " Expanding
on this requirement of conflict, the Court continued, "[i]n some cases, for
example where the federal interest requires a uniform rule, the entire body
of state law applicable to the area conflicts and is replaced by federal
rules." '336 In others, "the conflict is more narrow, and only particular ele-
ments of state law are superseded. 337
The Court saw no reason to distinguish between displacement of state
law by federal common law and displacement of incorporated (or adopted)
state law by a purely federal rule in cases where federal common law ap-
plies.33 Similarly, Professor Field has questioned whether a two-step proc-
333 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
334 Id. at 507.
335 Id. (citations omitted).
336 Id. at 508 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-367 (1943)).
337 Id. (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 595 (1973)).
338 The Court stated, in footnoted dicta:
We refer here to the displacement of state law, although it is possible to analyze it as the displace-
ment of federal-law reference to state law for the rule of decision. Some of our cases appear to re-
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ess of creating federal law, and then determining whether to incorporate
state law as the federal rule, makes sense.339 In our view, such a distinction
is required. The first step determines whether federal common law must
govern. As we have seen, federal common law governs when the potential
for bias in creating state law exists and other good reasons for creating fed-
eral law (such as uniformity) favor creating federal common law. The sec-
ond step is different; given that federal common law must apply, it asks
whether the substance of the rule should be a new, federal rule, or whether
the state rule on the issue will suffice.
On this latter question, it is important to note that states do not actually
discriminate in every instance in which they might be tempted to do so.
Nor will the remaining reasons for creating federal common law-such as
the need for uniformity-be implicated on the facts of all cases. Therefore,
in some cases-those in which (1) state laws that would operate in the ab-
sence of federal common law do not in fact discriminate against the unrep-
resented or underrepresented interests, and (2) other factors (such as
uniformity or the presence of the United States as a party) are not strongly
present-state rules may be adopted as the applicable federal common law
rule.34 ° These two criteria are often indirectly linked. On some matters, the
need for national uniformity is simply the flip side of the fear that states
will give too much weight to parochial interests. Clearfield Trust made this
point clearly:
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale and
transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in
several states. The application of state law ... would subject the rights and
duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of
the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.34" '
gard the area in which a uniquely federal interest exists as being entirely governed by federal law,
with federal law deigning to "borro[w]" ... or "incorporate[e]" or "adopt" ... state law except
where a significant conflict with federal policy exists. We see nothing to be gained by expanding
the theoretical scope of the federal pre-emption beyond its practical effect, and so adopt the more
modest terminology. If the distinction between displacement of state law and displacement of fed-
eral law's incorporation of state law ever makes a practical difference, it at least does not do so in
the present case.
Id. at 507 n.3 (citations omitted). See also O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (not-
ing that difference between applying state law of its own force or adopting it as the federal rule of deci-
sion "is of only theoretical interest").
339 See Field, supra note 14, at 950-53.
340 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) ("Undoubtedly, federal programs
that 'by their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation' necessitate formulation of
controlling federal rules.... Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state
law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision. Apart from considerations of uniformity, we must
also determine whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs. If
so, we must fashion special rules solicitous of those federal interests." (footnotes and citations omitted)).
341 Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367.
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If the area is one in which the state law on point actually discriminates
in favor of the state or its citizens, then state law must be displaced by fed-
eral common law; courts cannot incorporate biased state law. A good ex-
ample is Boyle. The Court found that a federal rule was needed to
implement the defense because "the state-imposed duty of care that is the
asserted basis of the contractor's liability. .. is precisely contrary to the
duty imposed by the Government contract.... .34 ' Consequently, the Court
concluded that "state law which holds Government contractors liable for
design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a
'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be displaced." '343 The
same reasoning militates in favor of a uniform, federal law in admiralty
prize cases and in cases involving foreign relations. In these areas, the risk
is great that a state, understandably focusing on the interests within its
boundaries, will give insufficient weight to the larger national and interna-
tional interests, and that each state, left to its own devices, will choose vary-
ing rules of decision.34
In other cases, however, there may be no evidence that state law is bi-
ased, and no other compelling reason to create a federal rule of decision.
For example, in Kimbell Foods,345 the Court held that federal common law
was the source of law for determining priority among creditors when a fed-
eral agency is one of the creditors. Nonetheless, the Court observed, that
determination does not mean that a federal rule is required:
We are unpersuaded that, in the circumstances presented here, nationwide
standards favoring claims of the United States are necessary to ease program
administration or to safeguard the Federal Treasury from defaulting debtors.
Because the state commercial codes "furnish convenient solutions in no way
inconsistent with adequate protection of the federal interest[s]," . . . we decline
to override intricate state laws of general applicability on which private credi-
tors base their daily commercial transactions.346
342 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509.
343 Id. at 512.
344 But see In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 701 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (predicting
that, in the context of lawsuits brought by military personnel injured in foreign conflict, each state would
choose to adopt a "national consensus" of state laws to determine government contractors' liability).
345 United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
346 Id. at 729 (citation omitted). On this reasoning, Clearfield Trust might be decided differently today.
In Clearfield Trust's day, the law of commercial paper was in a shambles; an older uniform act, the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, had been adopted in 1896, and was no longer functioning well or uniformly in
the states-a fact well known by the mid-1940s, when work on Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code
began. See U.C.C. § 3-101 cmt. (1957); ALl, COMMERCIAL CODE (GROUP No. 1) 1-5 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, Article III, 1947). Today, the Uniform Commercial Code makes uniform, in all states but Louisiana,
state laws regarding commercial paper, so that the problems of national disuniformity and outsider discrimi-
nation are no longer relevant in many contexts. Federal common law might still be required to deal with
problems around the margin-for instance, resolving interpretive questions arising under the UCC on which
states have taken different positions-but in the main it seems that greater overall uniformity would be cre-
ated by adopting the UCC as the federal common law of commercial paper. Cf Friendly, supra note 11, at
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Thus, the fear of discrimination against federal interests (when joined with
the status of the United States as a party) required that federal common law
be applied, but the lack of evidence that the state law in fact discriminated
against federal interests and the lack of a compelling argument for federal
uniformity permitted the Court to incorporate state law as the substance of
the governing federal common law.
CONCLUSION: JUSTIFYING FEDERAL COMMON LAW
We began with the task of creating a descriptive theory of federal
common law-of explaining those enclaves in which the Supreme Court it-
self acknowledges that it is creating federal common law. Important nor-
mative arguments militate against the existence of any federal common law.
Separation of powers concerns (Congress and not courts should make na-
tional law) and federalism concerns (federal common law is a hydra that
can swallow state lawmaking) head the list. At one level, our theory has
not grappled with those concerns, because we wanted only to account for
the phenomenon of federal common law, whatever its normative merits or
demerits. At a different level, however, grounding federal common law in
the protection of interests unrepresented or systematically underrepresented
in the creation of state law undeniably has a normative component. All
theories of federal common law inevitably mediate between the fact (and
maybe the necessity) of federal common law and the limits that must be
placed on it in order that it not become a constitutional embarrassment.
Grounding federal common law in the protection of unrepresented or
systematically underrepresented interests links federal common law to sig-
nificant thematic elements within the Constitution. Similar concerns
against discrimination find vent in numerous features of the Constitution
beyond Article 111-among them the dormant Commerce Clause,347 the Full
Faith and Credit Clause,348 the Privileges and Immunities Clause,349 the Su-
premacy Clause,35 ° the Privileges or Immunities Clause,35" ' and the Equal
409-11 (suggesting that Clearfield Trust could have adopted state law as the rule of decision). Indeed, the
choice between a unique federal common law rule and the adoption of state law is fluid, and might be
changed as the circumstances of state lawmaking change.
347 The Dormant Commerce Clause is derived by implication from the text of the Commerce Clause it-
self, see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3, and prohibits state rules that discriminate against or unduly burden inter-
state commerce in relation to intrastate commercial activity. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1895
(2005).
348 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
349 Id. art IV, § 2, cl. 1.
350 Id. art VI, cl. 2. In particular, the doctrine of preemption sometimes is used to prevent the enforce-
ment of narrow parochial interests against the unrepresented. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000).
351 U.S.CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Protection Clause.352 The idea also finds resonance with Carolene Prod-
uct's efforts to protect "discrete and insular minorities" that are shut out of
the political process,353 and with process-oriented theories of judicial re-
view.354 As we earlier suggested,355 in many cases the discriminatory effects
of state law can be dealt with by enjoining the application of the offending
law and leaving nondiscriminatory background law in place; here federal
common law is unnecessary. Federal common law needs to be developed
only when no neutral background law exists, and the states' competence to
develop that law is debatable.
For now, we do not wish to press on the connections between federal
common law and these other doctrines too much. We raise them sugges-
tively, to show that the reasons for and the limits on federal common law
travel along well-worn analytical paths, and to adumbrate more fruitful
connections between federal common law and the remainder of the Consti-
tution than are typically described in the literature. Because it connects to
the norms of political participation inherent in our system of government,
our theory assuages somewhat the antidemocratic and antifederalist im-
pulses that undeniably undergird federal common law. It explains why
courts must create federal common law, while setting boundaries on their
power to do so.
Our theory can nonetheless be criticized for its vagueness, and perhaps
for its undue simplicity. As to vagueness, "lack of representation" or "un-
der-representation" in the political process are ideas that are hardly self-
defining.356 We do not offer a definition of political representation, or a
means for distinguishing the systematically underrepresented from the ade-
quately represented losers of particular political fights. Indeed, some notion
of virtual representation of interests must operate in order for our theory to
work. In other words, even though Microsoft is not a citizen of the State of
Illinois, it is not automatically entitled to have federal common law, rather
than the law of Illinois, govern its rights and responsibilities. As long as
similarly situated entities have adequate participatory rights in Illinois, Mi-
crosoft has no grounds to request federal common law. The idea of virtual
representation simply shifts the ambiguity over one space, as courts now
352 Id; cf Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (incorporating equal protection principles into Due
Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).
353 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (arguing for heightened judi-
cial review of governmental actions when "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily ... relied upon to protect minorities").
Carolene Products was decided on the same day as Erie.
354 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); cf Merrill, supra note 39 (suggest-
ing links between federal common law and theories ofjudicial review).
355 See supra notes 328-332 and accompanying text.
356 For recent critiques of the process-oriented theory of judicial review with which our own theory
has some sympathy, see Symposium, On Democratic Ground: New Perspectives on John Hart Ely, 114
YALE L.J. 1193 (2005).
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must consider how comparable the interests of Microsoft are to those of
adequately represented entities. Admittedly, a gray area lurks around the
edges of our theory.
A related vagueness concern is the seemingly infinite malleability of
the theory. Because arguments of bias and inadequate political representa-
tion can be made in many cases, does our theory meaningfully exclude any
subjects from the potential scope of federal common law? In one sense, we
can provide no categorical answer, because we cannot pretend to know
every imaginable political permutation in the states. Under our theory, the
question of the power to create federal common law is often fact-bound, a
reality that allows for subjective values to creep into close cases.357 The de-
batable outcomes of the instance cases,358 Boyle,359 and perhaps Semtek,3 60
show that the theory is not always self-applying.
Nonetheless, the theory is capable of excluding significant areas from
the reach of federal common law. Barring a unique factor such as the pres-
ence of the United States as a party, certain types of legal disputes are
unlikely to result in federal common law: contracts, torts, property, corpo-
rate law, and a host of other doctrinal categories in which the participation
of adequately represented parties at the state level is likely to be active. The
limited enclaves of federal common law suggest that the presumption
probably lies against a finding of inadequate representation.
Indeed, two recent cases in which the Supreme Court has chosen not to
create federal common law-O 'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC36' and Atherton
v. FDIC62 -show the theory's teeth. In O'Melveny & Myers, the FDIC,
acting in its capacity as receiver of a failed bank, brought a state law claim
against the bank's attorneys. The attorneys defended the case by claiming
that the bank (and thus the FDIC, as the bank's successor in interest) was
already aware of the fraud that led to the bank's failure. The Court rejected
the FDIC's argument that the imputation of corporate officers' knowledge
of the fraud to the corporation should be determined as a matter of federal
law. The Court characterized the argument that federal common law should
generally govern the imputation of an officer's knowledge to a corporation
as "so plainly wrong." '363 It devoted more time to the argument that a fed-
357 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237, 1238
(2005) (noting that representation-reinforcing theories of judicial review are "laden with controversial
value judgments"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democ-
racy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1282 (2005) (noting that such theories are
"indeterminate").
358 See supra notes 306-307 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 281-286 and accompanying text.
360 See supra text following note 307.
361 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
362 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
363 O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 83.
100:585 (2006)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
eral rule of decision, rather than the state's law on imputation, should apply
when the FDIC is a party, but ultimately held against the FDIC:
The rules of decision at issue here do not govern the primary conduct of the
United States or any of its agents or contractors, but affect only the FDIC's
rights and liabilities, as receiver, with respect to primary conduct on the part of
private actors that has already occurred. Uniformity of law might facilitate the
FDIC's nationwide litigation of these suits, eliminating state-by-state research
and reducing uncertainty-but if the avoidance of those ordinary consequences
qualified as an identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in "federal
common-law" rules.36
O'Melveny & Myers correctly saw no reason to override state corporate
law, when private interests were presumptively adequately represented in
the state lawmaking process and a federal agency was acting only to enforce
one of those interests.
Even more instructive is Atherton, in which the Court considered the
creation of a federal common law standard of care owed by the officers of
federally chartered financial institutions. Under our theory, such a standard
would be appropriate only if it appeared likely that the interests of federally
chartered institutions or the federal government, which insures them, would
be discriminated against in state lawmaking. That question was precisely
the inquiry that the Court made. It traced the history of federally chartered
banks, noting the overt discrimination that the federal banks faced in the
nineteenth century. The Court noted that the argument for federal common
law, "with little more, might have seemed a strong one during most of the
first century of our Nation's history, for then state-chartered banks were the
norm and federally-chartered banks an exception-and federal banks often
encountered hostility and deleterious state laws." '365 But such was no longer
the case,366 and with it the need for federal common law collapsed. The
Court couched its analysis in terms of a lack of "a significant conflict or a
threat to a federal interest," '367 a concern which was distinct from the desire
for national uniformity.368 As the Court's analysis shows, the "significant
conflict or threat to a federal interest" thought necessary to create federal
common law is invidious discrimination against those poorly represented in
state lawmaking.
As for undue simplicity, federal common law is hydra-headed. It is a
fair point to wonder whether all of its manifestations can be explained in a
single formula. Perhaps, a critic might contend, no more can be said about
'6' Id. at 88.
365 Atherton, 519 U.S. at 221.
366 The Court suggested that the tide of state hostility to federal financial institutions turned shortly
after the Civil War, id. at 222, and noted that, in 1989, the number of federally chartered institutions ac-
tually exceeded the number of state-chartered institutions, id at 220.
367 Id. at 224.
368 See id. at 220 ("To invoke the concept of 'uniformity,' however, is not to prove its need.").
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federal common law than the Court said in Boyle-that federal common
law exists whenever uniquely federal interests demand it. Like "inadequate
representation," however, "uniquely federal interests" is not self-defining,
and equally fails to escape the criticism of vagueness. More fundamentally,
however, the protection of the unrepresented and systematically underrepre-
sented from bias in the lawmaking process is a quintessential-perhaps the
quintessential-federal interest with which courts must concern them-
selves.369
Of course, having (at least in most cases) an unelected federal judge
make law that only Congress or a constitutional amendment can change is
still problematic for any democrat. Moreover, a federal common law claim
creates federal jurisdiction. If one of the fears of state lawmaking is that
"the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial" and that "[n]o man
ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to
which he has the least interest or bias,"37 then putting a federal judge (at
least in most cases) in charge of determining the substance of federal com-
mon law is also an imperfect solution.37" ' We do not think these concerns
are immaterial. We accept Professor Field's idea that the competence of
courts to make law is one of the factors that should bear on a court's judg-
ment of whether a situation warrants federal common law, and whether
state law should be incorporated to determine the substance of federal
common law.
We do not for now tread further into the arguments about the legiti-
macy of common law in a democratic society. Our burden has been only to
demonstrate that Semtek, Boyle, and the "enclaves" represent not separate
areas of federal common lawmaking power, but examples of a single phe-
nomenon-of areas in which states, if allowed to prescribe the governing
rules, would be tempted to stack the deck in favor of themselves or their
citizens. Once a theory of federal common law has been created, the merits
of federal common law can be fully debated. Only through this discern-
ment process can it be understood when courts must create federal common
law and what its substance should be-and only through creation and appli-
cation of federal common law in appropriate areas can the courts ensure, in
369 See ELY, supra note 354.
370 TmE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 536.
371 With the exception of cases between two states and cases involving admiralty, see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1251(a), 1333 (2000), cases in which federal common law is applied do not typically involve exclusive
federal jurisdiction. Moreover, because of the operation of the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal courts
would have jurisdiction over the government contractor defense only if diversity jurisdiction were present.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Therefore, state courts will on some occa-
sions have the opportunity to participate in the development of federal common law rules and thereby reduce
the risk of bias and ideological capture inherent in a single court's exclusive determination of its own law.
See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
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the present imperfect world, that "the peace of the WHOLE... [is] not...
left at the disposal of a PART. 372
372 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 533-34.
